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ABSTRACT 
Parenting by the Clock 85 
The American Law Institute proposes that in contested physical 
custody cases, the court should allocate to each parent a proportion of 
the child's time that approximates the proportion of time each spent 
performing caretaking functions in the past. Examined through the 
lens of child development research, the approximation rule is unlikely 
to improve on the best-interests-of-the-child standard. The 
approximation rule is difficult to apply, creates a new focus for 
disputing parents, renders a poor estimate of parents' contributions to 
their child's best interest, and overlooks parents' intangible, yet 
significant, contributions to their child's well-being. Measuring past-
caretaking time is difficult, and quantity of care does not correlate 
with quality of care. A best-interests standard that retains the benefits 
to children of individualized decision making is preferable in the 
context of contemporary reforms that accommodate new knowledge 
and encourage non-adversarial resolutions of custody disputes. 
Keywords: approximation rule, child custody, divorce, custody 
disputes, best-interests-of-the-child, joint custody, equal custody, 
primary-caretaker presumption, friendly parent presumption, 
American Law Institute. 
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There is always an easy solution to every human problem-neat, 
plausible, and wrong. 
- H. L. Mencken 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1972, the best-interest-of-the-child standard (the best-interest 
standard) replaced a centuries-old reliance on stereotyped gender-
based assumptions in child custody matters. I In recent years, the 
emphasis on individualized multi-factored custody determinations 
has come under assault. Critics raise two main concerns related to 
the broad judicial discretion inherent in the prevailing standard: the 
vague standard increases the likelihood of psychologically harmful 
litigation (and decreases the rate of pre-trial settlements), and it 
serves as a conduit for personal biases to influence outcomes.2 Of the 
various remedies proposed, the one poised to replace the best-interest 
standard, by virtue of its endorsement from the prestigious American 
Law Institute (ALI), is the approximation rule. 3 The rule divides the 
child's time with each parent according to the proportion of time that 
each parent participated in caretaking prior to the separation. 4 
ALI's Restatements of the Law-formulated by influential jurists, 
bar leaders, and law professors-profoundly influence American law, 
even prior to legislative endorsement. After a slow start, the 
approximation rule is gaining ground. Its impact is felt in courts. In 
In re Marriage of Hansen, the Iowa Supreme Court, electing not to 
adopt the approximation rule absent legislative approval, nevertheless 
praised the rationale behind the rule: "By focusing on historic 
patterns of care giving, the approximation rule provides a relatively 
objective factor for the court to consider.,,5 In In re The Marriage of 
Powers, the same court favorably cites a rationale for the 
approximation rule offered by ALI's reporter: '''[P]ast caretaking 
1. See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981); Stephen J. Bahr, Trends 
in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of Maternal Deference Made a 
Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 249 (1994). Professor Guggenheim points out, "Even 
though as late as 1976 in more than thirty states the mother was awarded custody of 
her young children, so long as she was fit, the tender years doctrine was rapidly 
replaced by gender-neutral rules." MARTIN M. GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 147 (2005) (endnote omitted). 
2. See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. 
REv. 497, 508 (1987). 
3. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]' 
4. See Marygold S. Melli, The American Law Institute Principles of Family Dissolution, 
the Approximation Rule and Shared Parenting, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 347, 353 (2004). 
5. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2007). 
2011] Parenting by the Clock 87 
patterns likely are a fairly reliable proxy of the intangible qualities 
such as parental abilities and emotional bonds that are so difficult for 
courts to ascertain.",6 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
cited the approximation rule in In re Custody of Kali to support a 
preference for the continuity of current relationships.? 
In addition to case law citations, the approximation rule has been 
adopted by West Virginia;8 must be considered by judges in Catalan, 
Spain when making custody determinations;9 and is under serious 
consideration in other jurisdictions, including Illinois and 
Pennsylvania. 10 Even when the rule falls short of adoption, 
proponents' arguments present formidable obstacles to other family 
law reform proposals, such as joint custody presumptions. In debates 
over child custody reform, the approximation rule has become the 
pivotal issue. 11 
6. In re Marriage of Powers, No. 07-0006,2008 WL 2312873, at *2, *3 (Iowa May 16, 
2008) (quoting Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the 
American Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the 
Individual Child's Best Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467,473 (1999». 
7. In re Custody ofKali, 792 N.E.2d 635,642 (Mass. 2003). 
8. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-11-106 (West 2007). 
9. See Andrina Hayden, Shared Custody: A Comparative Study of the Position in Spain 
and England, INDRET, Jan. 2011, at 14-16, available at 
http://www.indret.com/pdfJ795 _en. pdf. 
10. Illinois is currently considering a proposal that adopts verbatim ALI's description of 
caretaking functions and incorporates the approximation rule as one factor in 
determining best interests. H.B. 4158, 94th Gen. Assemb., (Ill. 2005). In testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Family Law of the 
Pennsylvania House of Representatives, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Baer 
recommends adoption of the approximation rule as the next standard in custody 
legislation. Hearing on H.R. 418, H.R. 463, and H.R. 1639 Before the Subcomm. On 
Family Law of the H. Judiciary Comm., 2010 Legis., Reg. Sess. 32-33 (pa. 2010) 
(statement of Justice Baer), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/ 
cfdocs/legis/tr/transcripts/20 1 0_ 0022T.pdf. 
11. See Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1157-58, 1162-64, 1172-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999) (upholding a trial court's custody determination; withdrawing the ruling 
of an appellate panel that relied on the approximation rule; refusing to adopt a 
dissenting judge's reliance on the approximation rule); Lynn D. Wardle, 
Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute's "Domestic 
Partners" Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1193 ("[B]ecause many influential 
jurists, law professors, and bar leaders helped to create it, it is certain to find a 
receptive audience in at least some lawmaking, legal, and academic circles."); Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, Introduction to RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 1,2 n.5 
(Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) ("It is difficult to overstate the degree of the ALI's 
influence. As of March I, 2004, state and federal courts have cited the Restatements 
161,486 times."); id. at 3 ("Because of the prestige of the ALI, judges will 
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Steeped in assumptions about child and family development, yet 
lacking reliable social science support, the approximation rule begs 
for closer examination before judges and legislators embrace it. This 
article examines the strengths and weaknesses of the best-interest 
standard as it is applied in contemporary cases, and compares it with 
the alternative proposed by the ALI. Results from the first survey of 
lawyers and child custody evaluators regarding the approximation 
rule support the conclusion that the rule is unlikely to do a better job 
than the status quo in securing children's best interests. 12 The rule 
provides incentives to increase rather than reduce parental conflict. 13 
It mistakenly assumes that past caretaking is an index of qualitative 
aspects of parent-child relations; this assumption reflects a simplistic 
and faulty understanding of the science of child development. 14 
Furthermore, the exceptions to the rule enumerated by the Principles 
of the Law of Family Dissolution (Principles) are precisely the issues 
raised in custody disputes; thus, the exceptions swallow the rule and 
undermine the Principles' goals of reducing the incidence of custody 
undoubtedly rely on the PRINCIPLES as they have relied on the ALI's Restatements. 
Legislators are also likely to turn, rightly or wrongly, to the PRINCIPLES for 
guidance .... "); Robert 1. Levy, Custody Law and the ALl's Principles: A Little 
History, a Little Policy, and Some Very Tentative Judgments, in RECONCEIVING THE 
FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION 67, 74 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) ("Because the 
drafters' proposal comes with the prestigious imprint of the American Law Institute, 
whose products in the past have attracted state Supreme Court approvals even without 
legislative enactment, and because the proposal has already been enacted by one 
legislature, the scheme is likely to receive widespread legislative scrutiny.") (footnote 
omitted); Carl E. Schneider, Afterword: Elite Principles: The ALI Proposals and the 
Politics of Law Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE F AMIL Y: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 489, 491 (Robin 
Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) ("The ALI has wielded influence beyond the fantasies of 
its founders. The Model Penal Code and the Restatements are as close to binding 
precedent as nongovernmental authority can be, and they are only part of the 
Institute's agenda."). For a contrary view describing "the anemic influence of the 
Principles with rule makers" see Michael R. Clisham and Robin Fretwell Wilson, 
American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years 
After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L. Q. 573,608 
(2008). 
12. Richard A. Warshak, The Approximation Rule Survey: The American Law Institute's 
Proposed Reform Misses the Target, 5 S. B. TEX. SECT. 22 (2011). 
13. See Rachel M. Colan cecco, Note, A Flexible Solution to a Knotty Problem: The Best 
Interests of the Child Standard in Relocation Disputes, 1 DREXEL L. REv. 573, 600 
(2009). 
14. See Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to Make 
Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 F AM. & 
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 297, 297 (2000). 
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litigation, narrowing the scope of custody trials, and decreasing 
judicial discretion in custody cases. IS 
Though courts are fallible, in contested custody cases children's 
best interests are more likely to be discerned through a multi-factored 
inquiry than by restricting courts to judging the merits of parents' 
competing claims about past caregiving time. 16 The best-interest 
standard is preferable when it is applied in the context of reforms that 
encourage and support non-adversarial approaches to resolving 
custody disputes. I? Such reforms, currently in place in many 
jurisdictions and endorsed by the Principles, lower the incidence of 
protracted litigation, reduce the conflicts to which children are 
exposed, and reflect contemporary understanding of factors 
associated with optimal adjustment of children whose parents live 
apart from each other. 18 
II. GENDER STEREOTYPES AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
BEST-INTEREST STANDARD 
Gender-based presumptions, reflecting stereotypes about the 
nature of men, women, and children, have ruled child custody 
decisions throughout history.19 Until the early part of the nineteenth 
century, common law gave fathers an automatic right to child 
custody.20 By virtue of laws regarding property ownership, fathers 
15. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1)(a)-(h); id. ch. 1, topic 1 (discussing the goals of 
the PRINCIPLES); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the 
Context oj the ALI Principles oj the Law oj Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'y 
& L. 5, 6 (2002) ("The goal of these Principles, which address property distribution, 
spousal support, child support, unmarried cohabitation and agreements as well as 
custodial arrangements for children, is to achieve greater determinacy in family law 
while preserving the autonomy of partners and parents to make their own decisions 
about the terms under which relationships, entered into as if permanent, are 
dissolved."). 
16. Richard A. Warshak, Punching the Parenting Time Clock: The Approximation Rule, 
Social Science, and the Baseball Bat Kids, 45 FAM. CT. REv. 600, 613 (2007) 
("Instead of elevating anyone factor above all others, a contemporary application of 
the best interests standard allows a multifactored inquiry into children's needs that can 
be regularly updated as new knowledge emerges. "). 
1 7. Id. at 60Q-{) 1. 
18. Id. at 600. 
19. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of child custody law, see LaKeisha J. 
Johnson, The Best Interests Standard: How Broad Judicial Discretion and Influences 
oj Social and Political Suggestion Have Led to an Abandonment oj the Rule's 
Primary Purpose in Child Custody Decisions 1, 7 (Bepress Legal Series, Working 
Paper No. 435,2004), available at http://law.bepress.comJexpresso/eps/435. 
20. Id. at 4. 
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were best able to provide financially for children.21 Also, fathers 
were considered to be children's natural guardians who could best 
bestow love on them.22 Over time, this sentiment was replaced with 
the belief that children of tender years needed nurturing that a mother 
could best provide?3 What became known as the tender years 
doctrine emerged as early as 1813 in the Pennsylvania decision, 
Commonwealth v. Addicks.24 Overlooking the mother's adultery, 
Chief Justice William Tilghman ruled: 
We cannot avoid expressing our disapprobation of the 
mother's conduct, although as far as regards her treatment of 
her children, she is in no fault. They appear to have been 
well taken care of in all respects. It is to them, that our 
anxiety is principally directed; and it appears to us, that 
considering their tender age, they stand in need of that kind 
of assistance, which can be afforded by none so well as a 
mother. It is on their account, therefore, that exercising the 
discretion with which the law has invested us, we think it 
best, at present, not to take them from her. 25 
In England, the Talfourd Act of 1839 formalized the tender years 
doctrine by giving courts the authority to award mothers custody of 
children under the age of seven years.26 Over time, the tender years 
doctrine was extended to include children of all ages.27 
2l. Jd. at 4-5. 
22. Jd. 
23. Id. at 7-8. 
24. Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (pa. 1813). 
25. Jd. at 521-22. But, three years later, the Court granted custody to the father because 
the mother has fallen into a fatal error, on a fundamental point of 
morals-the obligation of the marriage contract. It is the more 
incumbent on us, therefore, to guard the children against the 
consequences of this pernicious mistake, and to fortify their 
minds, by inspiring them with fixed principles .... 
Commonwealth v. Addicks, 2 Sergo & Rawle 174, 177 (Pa. 1816). For another early 
expression of the tender years doctrine, see Helms V. Franciscus, 2 Bland 544, 563 
(Ch. Md. 1830) ("The father is the rightful and legal guardian of all his infant 
children; and in general, no court can take from him the custody and control of 
them. . .. Yet even a court of common law will not go so far as to hold nature in 
contempt, and snatch helpless, puling infancy from the bosom of an affectionate 
mother, and place it in the coarse hands of the father. The mother is the softest and 
safest nurse of infancy, and with her it will be left in opposition to this general right of 
the father. "). 
26. The Talfourd Act was also known as the Custody of Infants Act. The Act was 
spearheaded by Lady Caroline Norton and is regarded as the first piece of feminist 
legislation passed into law. See 1830 Custody of Children Act, SPARTACUS Eouc., 
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In the 1960s, the movement to liberate our culture from the 
straitjacket of rigid gender stereotypes challenged maternal 
preference rules.28 The rise of mothers in the workplace, along with 
growing concern about unequal treatment of men and women, 
contributed to the decline in a preference for sole maternal custody.29 
In addition, results of social science studies throughout the United 
States converged to support the position that most children need more 
contact with their father after divorce than they were having. 30 The 
benefits of father involvement, especially for boys, are most apparent 
when the mother values the father--child relationship, the children 
witness little overt conflict between parents, and the father is 
reasonably well-adjusted, supportive, and authoritative. 31 Based on 
these research findings, some scholars advocated replacing the 
maternal preference presumption with a joint custody presumption, 
whereas other scholars sought to preserve the familiar presumption 
but modify its application to provide children more contact with 
noncustodial fathers. 32 
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uklWcustody39.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2011); 
Custody Rights and Domestic Violence, www.parliament.uk, 
http://www.pariiament.uklabout/living-heritage/transformingsocietyIprivate-
liveslrelationships/overview/custodyrightsl (last visited Nov. 28,2011). 
27. See The Custody of Infants Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 12 § 1 (Eng.); Women & 
History: Marriage & Civil Law, ABOUT. COM, http://womenshistory. 
about.comllibrary/etextlbll 911_ womeng.htm (last visited Nov 28, 2011 ) (quoting an 
entry from the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica). 
28. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (W. W. Norton & Co. 1963). 
29. For a discussion of the literature on feminist opposition to the tender years 
presumption, see, e.g., Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act-and Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies, BYU L. 
REV. 43,49 (1991). See generally MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 124 (1994) (discussing the history of American Child Custody 
Law). 
30. See, e.g., SANFORD L. BRAVER & DIANE O'CONNELL, DIVORCED DADS: SHATTERING 
THE MYTHS (1998) (Arizona); E. Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox, & Roger Cox, 
Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: 
PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982) (Virginia); 
in California: JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE 
BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) (California); 
RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION (1992) (Texas); Richard A. 
Warshak, Father-Custody and Child Development: A Review and Analysis of 
Psychological Research, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 185 (1986) (Texas). 
31. Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children's Best Interest in Relocation Cases: 
Burgess Revisited, 34 F AM. L.Q. 83, 90 (2000). 
32. Shannon Dean Sexton, Note, Custody System Free of Gender Preferences and 
Consistent with the Best Interests of the Child: Suggestions for a More Protective and 
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By 1972, lawmakers and judges began replacing the tender years 
presumption with a gender-neutral best-interest-of-the-child 
standard33-although fathers' rights advocates assert that the legacy 
of the tender years presumption continues to favor mothers in court,34 
and women's advocates claim that the pendulum has swung too far in 
the other direction and that judges are biased in favor of fathers. 35 
Equitable Custody System, 88 Ky. LJ. 761, 775-76 (2000). See Solangel Maldonado, 
Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 921, 964--66 (2005). 
33. See Johnson, supra note 19, at 4-5. 
34. See, e.g., William C. Smith, Dads Want Their Day: Fathers Charge Legal Bias 
Towards Moms Hamstrings Them as Full-Time Parents, 89 A.B.A. 1. 38,41 (2003); 
see also Leighton E. Stamps, Age Differences Among Judges Regarding Maternal 
Preference in Child Custody Decisions, 18 CT. REv. 18,20-21 (2002) (reporting the 
results of a survey of judges in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee). The 
study found a "fairly consistent tendency toward maternal preference by the judges." 
Id. At 20 This bias was more prevalent among older judges. Results indicated that 
36% of younger judges and 71% of older judges agreed that "[m]others are the 
preferred custodian when children are under the age of 6," while none of the younger 
judges and only 1 % of the older judges agreed that fathers are the preferred custodian. 
Id. See generally David Dotterweich & Michael McKinney, National Attitudes 
Regarding Gender Bias in Child Custody Cases, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 
208, 215 (2000) (reporting that 44% of judges in Maryland, Missouri, Texas, and 
Washington agreed that custody awards are made "based on the assumption that 
young children belong with their mothers," and only 33% believed that courts give 
fair consideration to fathers); William V. Fabricius, Sanford L. Braver, Priscila Diaz 
& Clorinda E. Velez, Custody and Parenting Time: Links to Family Relationships and 
Well-Being After Divorce, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 201, 
212-13 (Michael E. Lamb, ed., 5th ed. 2010) (reporting a study in which about 60% 
of family law attorneys thought the Arizona legal system was biased in favor of 
mothers, and only 35% thought the system was not gender-biased). Views of bias did 
not differ between female and male attorneys or between attorneys whose clients are 
predominantly mothers or fathers. Id. at 212. The same study reported that the 
general public was even more likely to perceive a "slant" toward mothers (83%) with 
only 16% perceiving the legal system as unbiased. Id. at 213 see also BRAVER & 
O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 103 (reporting that divorcing parents, both mothers and 
fathers, believe that the family law climate favors mothers); Sanford L. Braver, 
Jeffrey T. Cookston & Bruce R. Cohen, Experiences of Family Law Attorneys with 
Current Issues in Divorce Practice, 51 NAT'L COUNCIL ON FAM. REL. 325, 327-30 
(2002) (reporting that experienced divorce attorneys, female and male, believe that the 
legal system is biased toward mothers); Sanford L. Braver, Ira M. Ellman, Ashley M. 
Votruba & William V. Fabricius, Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, 
17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 212,214 (2011) ( "Whatever the objective truth about 
judicial decision-making, several studies have shown that the public has the 
widespread perception that the custody process is heavily biased in favor of 
mothers."). 
35. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in 
Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 235, 236 (1982); Lynn H. 
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Referencing legislation that supposedly created an equal playing field 
for fathers and mothers, State ex rei. Watts v. Watts reversed a 
decision based on the tender years presumption: 
[T]here has been a pattern of at least cursory invocation by 
the courts in New York and elsewhere, of the presumption 
that children of tender years, all other things being equal, 
should be given into the custody of their mother. . . . As 
Foster and Freed, authors of the comprehensive treatise Law 
and the Family, New York, Vol. 2 (1967) stated[,] 
"The statutory mandate in practice is ignored and instead 
of equality as between the parents, the mother's claim to the 
child is paramount." ... 
The "tender years presumption" is actually a blanket 
judicial finding of fact, a statement by a court that, until 
proven otherwise by the weight of substantial evidence, 
mothers are always better suited to care for young children 
than fathers. This flies in the face of the legislative finding 
of fact underlying the specific command of [the statute], that 
the best interests of the child are served by the court's 
approaching the facts of the particular case before it without 
sex preconceptions of any kind. 36 
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act advanced the provision 
that "[t]he court shall determine custody in accordance with the best 
interest of the child.,,37 The Act then instructs the court to "consider 
all relevant factors," including the wishes of the parents and children; 
the children's relationships with parents, siblings, and other people 
who may significantly affect the children's best interests; the 
children's adjustment to their home, school, and community; and "the 
mental and physical health of all individuals involved.,,38 But the 
comments to the UMDA contemplate retaining a preference for 
maternal custody of young children and regard such a "rule of 
Schafran, Gender Bias in Family Courts, 17 FAM. Aovoc. 22-23 (1994). Braver, 
Cookston & Cohen, supra note 34, at 330, report that 29% of family law attorneys 
believe their "average female clients" would judge the legal system as biased in favor 
of fathers and 29% thought these clients would perceive bias in favor of mothers. But 
see Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 236, in which only 5% of family attorneys and 
about I % of Tucson citizens thought the Arizona legal system was biased in favor of 
fathers. 
36. State ex rei. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287-88 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973). 
37. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 282 (\998). 
38. Jd. 
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thumb" as a shorthand expression of the best interest of children.39 
By 1981 twenty states expressly abolished the tender years doctrine 
by statute or court decision.40 The doctrine did, however, remain in 
effect in some form in at least twenty-two states.41 In states that 
formally abolished the doctrine, it continued to be applied both by 
parental decisions and court decisions without formal 
acknowledgment.42 By the mid-1990s, it was apparent that the legal 
framework for child custody decisions had undergone a revolution 
with many more statutes explicitly prohibiting the centuries-old 
reliance on gender preferences.43 This freed courts to individually 
determine the best decision-making and residential arrangements for 
children whose parents lived apart from each other. 
Operating without the safety net of an explicit presumption leaves 
courts with broad discretion. Critics raise several concerns about the 
best-interest standard. The chief concerns are that (1) any indefinite 
standard increases the likelihood that parents will take their chances 
in court rather than settle custody disputes44 and (2) the standard 
provides no objective basis for predicting which custody disposition 
will promote a particular child's best interest and thus the vague 
standard serves as a conduit for personal biases to influence the 
court's decisions.45 
Various alternatives have been proposed to remedy the perceived 
problems of the current standard. These include a primary-caretaker 
39. Id. cmt. ("Although none of the familiar presumptions developed by the case law are 
mentioned here, the language of the section is consistent with preserving such rules of 
thumb. The preference for the mother as custodian of young children when all things 
are equal, for example, is simply a shorthand method of expressing the best interest of 
children-and this section enjoins judges to decide custody cases according to that 
general standard."). 
40. Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 691, 691 n.4 (Ala. 1981). 
41. Jd. at 691 & n.3. Tennessee applied a tender years presumption as late as 1996: "In 
the case of a child of tender years, the gender of the parent may be considered by the 
court as a factor in determining custody after an examination of the fitness of each 
party seeking custody." TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(d) (1996). 
42. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. 
L. REv. 615, 617-22 (1992). 
43. See id. at 619-23. 
44. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 
U. CHI. L. REv. 1,23-24 (1987); GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 158. 
45. See, e.g., Robert E. Emery, Rule or Rorschach? Approximating Children's Best 
Interests, 1 CHILD. DEV. PERSP. 132, 134 (2007); Robert J. Levy, Rights and 
Responsibilitiesfor Extended Family Members?, 27 FAM. L.Q. 191, 197 (1993); Mary 
E. O'Connell, When Noble Aspirations Fail: Why We Need the Approximation Rule, 
1 CHILD. DEV. PERSP. 129, 130 (2007). 
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presumption, generally favored by mothers' rights advocates;46 a 
presumption that the child's time will be divided equally between 
homes, generally favored by fathers' rights advocates;47 and an 
emphasis on empowering children by giving significant weight to 
their expressed wishes, preferred by some scholars who write about 
children's rights.48 
In its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, the ALI enters 
the debate by proposing an approximation rule to govern court 
decisions in cases where parents cannot agree on physical 
(residential) custody.49 The rule divides the child's time with each 
parent according to the proportion of time that each parent had 
participated in caretaking prior to the separation.50 The Principles 
assumes that quantity of past caretaking provides a straightforward 
proxy for qualitative psychological factors associated with children's 
best interests.51 Some mental health professionals share this 
assumption and believe that the approximation rule will ameliorate 
the indefiniteness of the best-interest standard, be easier to implement 
46. For discussions, both pro and con, of the primary caretaker presumption, also known 
as the primary parent presumption, see, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, From a Tender 
Years Presumption to a Primary Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really 
Changed? .. Should It?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 75, 83-85 (1993); Martha Fineman, 
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody 
Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 770-73 (1988); Joan B. Kelly, The 
Determination of Child Custody, 4 FUTURE CHILD. 121, 130 (1994); Kathryn L. 
Mercer, The Ethics of Judicial Decision-Making Regarding Custody of Minor 
Children: Looking at the "Best Interests of the Child" and the "Primary Caretaker" 
Standards as Utility Rules, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 389,403-14 (1997); Marcia O'Kelly, 
Blessing the Tie That Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker as Custodian, 63 
N.D. L. REv. 481, 533-34 (1987); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: 
Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 
2283-88 (1991) (analyzing and critiquing the primary caretaker presumption); Paul L. 
Smith, The Primary Caretaker Presumption: Have We Been Presuming Too Much?, 
75 IND. L. J. 731,732-46; Richard A. Warshak, The Primary Parent Presumption: 
Primarily Meaningless, in 10 1+ PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE F AMIL Y LAWYER 123, 
123-25 (Gregg M. Herman ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
47. For arguments favoring and opposing joint physical custody, see, e.g., JOINT CUSTODY 
& SHARED PARENTING (Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991); WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY 
REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 177-205. 
48. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Children's Rights and the Needfor Protection, 34 
FAM. L.Q. 421, 434-40 (2000); Randy Frances Kandel, Just Ask the Kid! Towards a 
Rule of Children's Choice in Custody Determinations, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 299 
(1994). 
49. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1). 
50. Id. 
51. See id. § 2.08(1)(d). 
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than the current standard, reduce the incidence and scope of custody 
litigation, and provide a clear and efficient measure of children's best 
interests. 52 
III. BENEFITS OF THE BEST-INTEREST-OF-THE-CHILD 
STANDARD 
Most aspects of the law involve a tension between rules and 
discretion, and between objectivity, predictability, and ease of 
administration versus individualization and flexibility. Take the 
simple act of granting a driver's license to a teen. In Texas, a child 
looks forward to becoming eligible for a license on her sixteenth 
birthday. 53 The law makes no accommodation for the wide range of 
physical and psychological traits related to competent driving. 
Regardless of a child's judgment, eye-hand coordination, speed of 
reflexes, maturity, and ability to maintain attention versus 
distractibility, all teens become eligible for a driver's license the day 
they tum sixteen.54 This law is easy to administer. The date is 
objective and predictable. Although some people will not be truly 
capable of safe driving until a year later, and some were capable a 
year earlier, the law shows no flexibility to take into account 
individual circumstances. 
Until the last third of the twentieth century, child custody 
decisions were guided by presumptions that provided a level of 
predictability and ease of administration comparable to that of laws 
regarding drivers' licenses. 55 Few allowances were made for 
individual family circumstances. 56 A presumption in favor of 
maternal custody served as the backdrop of negotiations. 57 It was 
clear to all parties that, absent a showing of severe unfitness or such 
52. Emery, supra note 45, at 134; Robert E. Emery, Randy K. Otto & William T. 
O'Donohue, A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations: Limited Science 
and a Flawed System, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. i, i-ii (2005); Robert F. Kelly & 
Shawn L. Ward, Allocating Custodial Responsibilities at Divorce: Social Science 
Research and the American Law Institute's Approximation Rule, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 
350, 352-53 (2002); Eleanor E. Maccoby, A Cogent Case for a New Child Custody 
Standard, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. I, i-ii (2005); GARY B. MELTON, JOHN PETRILA, 
NORMAN G. POYTHRESS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS 
FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 
546 (3d ed. 2007). 
53. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.204 (West 2011). 
54. Id. 
55. Emery, supra note 45, at 133; Smith, supra note 34, at 40. 
56. See State ex reI. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287-88 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973). 
57. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979). 
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an exception as adultery, mothers had the upper hand III custody 
disputes.58 
The a priori preference for mothers clashed with the movement in 
society away from gender-stereotyped roles and with the trend in law 
toward equal treatment of men and women. 59 Perhaps more 
important, the science of child development progressed to the point 
where it documented the widespread harm to children who were 
pigeonholed into a one-size-fits-all custody arrangement that reduced 
daily contact with fathers to a mere few days per month at most. 60 
Although such arrangements were not dictated by a maternal 
preference presumption per se, they did proceed from the same belief 
that children belonged primarily with their mother. 
Society's response was to replace the maternal-custody 
presumption with an indeterminate best-interest-of-the-child 
standard.61 Though most jurisdictions provide a list of factors for the 
court to consider, these are quite general and allow much room for 
judicial discretion. 62 The primary purpose of the best-interest 
standard, at least formally, is to underscore the priority of the welfare 
of the child who is an innocent bystander to the parents' adversarial 
litigation, as opposed to any presumption that treats the child's 
welfare as subordinate to parental rights and entitlements.63 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court expresses this purpose: 
The "best-interest-of-the-child" standard is more than a 
statement of the primary criterion for decision or the factors 
to be considered; it is an expression of the court's special 
responsibility to safeguard the interests of the child at the 
center of a custody dispute because the child cannot be 
presumed to be protected by the adversarial process. That 
responsibility was perhaps best articulated by Judge 
Cardozo: 
58. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88. 
59. Levy, supra note 29, at 48-50. 
60. See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Symposium: The Parent-Child Relationship 
and the Current Cycle of Family Law Reform: Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 455,458-60 (1984). 
61. ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
MODELS FOR DWORCING FAMILIES 162 (2004). 
62. Id. at I 63-.Q4. 
63. It might be argued, though, that a best-interest determination could mask highly 
personal decisions that may not elevate children's needs over other considerations, as 
in the example of a judge who rules against a mother because of her adulterous affair. 
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"[The Chancellor J acts as parens patriae to do what is 
best for the interest of the child. He is to put himself in the 
position of a 'wise, affectionate, and careful parent' and 
make provision for the child accordingly. . .. He is not 
adjudicating a controversy between adversary parties, to 
compose their private differences. He is not determining 
rights 'as between a parent and a child,' or as between one 
parent and another. . .. Equity does not concern itself with 
such disputes in their relation to the disputants. Its concern 
is for the child.,,64 
Beyond the emphasis on children's welfare trumping other 
concerns, defenders of the best-interest standard regard its 
indeterminacy as ensuring two benefits: flexibility and adaptability.65 
The best-interest standard is flexible because it prioritizes 
individualized decisions over the expediency of relying on the same 
formula for all families. 66 Professor Andrew Schepard regards this 
aspect of the standard as "a great moral virtue" and "a tribute to our 
society's collective sense that relationships between children and 
parents are unique and should be judged individually.,,67 A similar 
view is found in Bazemore v. Davis: 
A court in a child custody case acts as [p Jarens patriae. It is 
not enough to suggest that the task of deciding custody is a 
difficult one, or that the use of a presumption would result in 
a correct determination more often than not. A norm is ill-
suited for determining the future of a unique being whose 
adjustment is vital to the welfare of future generations. 
Surely, it is not asking too much to demand that a court, in 
64. Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556, 577-78 (N.J. 1996) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (quoting Queen v. Gyngall, 
[1893] 2 Q.B. 232, at 241 (Eng.)). 
65. See infra pp. 98-102 and accompanying notes. 
66. See Kelly, supra note 46, at 128 ("The best interests standard indicated a willingness 
on the part of the legal system to consider custody outcomes on a case-by-case basis, 
rather than adjudicating children as a class or homogeneous grouping."); E. MAVIS 
HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BEllER OR WORSE: DIVORCED RECONSIDERED 
275 (2002) ("Be suspicious of averages and focus on diversity. Averages conceal the 
great variability in how individual men and women, boys and girls function in 
intimate relationships, and how they cope when these relationships alter or break 
down and they have to build a new life. It is the diversity rather than the predictability 
or inevitability of pathways in intimate relationships over the course of life that is 
striking. . .. [T]here is great diversity in routes taken after marital breakup, in life in a 
single-parent household, and in new cohabiting or remarried relationships."). 
67. SCHEPARD, supra note 61, at 164. 
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making a detennination as to the best interest of a child, 
make the determination upon specific evidence relating to 
that child alone. . .. [M]agic fonnulas have no place in 
decisions designed to salvage human values.68 
99 
The open-ended best-interest standard frees courts to craft 
decisions on a case-by-case basis, drawing on a comprehensive 
inquiry into each child's needs and the extent to which various 
outcomes can be expected to meet these needs. In so doing, it avoids 
elevating one factor above all others and, at least fonnally, avoids 
relying on stereotypes and parental entitlements. When applying the 
best-interest test most courts focus on multiple factors enumerated 
either in statutes or in prior legal cases. 69 The reliance on multiple 
factors finds support in the social science literature regarding 
children's positive and negative outcomes after divorce. 70 In a 
comprehensive and erudite review of this literature, Kelly and Emery 
conclude: 
In the last decade, researchers have identified a number 
of protective factors that may moderate the risks associated 
with divorce for individual children and that contribute to 
the variability in outcomes observed in children of divorce. 
These include specific aspects of the psychological 
adjustment and parenting of custodial parents, the type of 
relationships that children have with their nonresident 
parents, and the extent and type of conflict between 
parents. 71 
The best-interest standard allows courts to consider such 
protective factors and to apply knowledge from psychological 
68. Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1382-83 (D.C. 1978) (en banc) (citation omitted) 
(citing Lemay v. Lemay, 247 A.2d 189, 191 (N.H. 1968». 
69. Such factors generally include (but are not limited to): the child's relationship with 
each parent; the child's wishes; the child's involvement with each parent; the child's 
adjustment at home, school, and in the community; the capacity of each parent to meet 
the child's developmental needs; special needs of the child; the impact on the child of 
the mental and physical health of the parents; evidence of family violence; substance 
abuse; each parent's support for the child's relationship with the other parent; and the 
degree of cooperation and communication between the parents. See MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (3)(a}-(k) (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 
2011); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.134 (West 2005). 
70. Joan B. Kelly & Robert E. Emery, Children's Adjustment Following Divorce: Risk 
and Resilience Perspectives, 52 F AM. REL. 352, 356-58 (2003). 
71. Id. at 356. 
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research to the specifics of each custody case. The various proposed 
alternatives to the best-interest standard, including the approximation 
rule, fail to take such factors into account. 72 
The second benefit related to the best-interest standard's 
indeterminacy is adaptability. It is able to accommodate new 
knowledge and understanding about children's needs and to respond 
to changing legal and social trends. 73 For instance, in the 1980s, 
studies began accumulating that documented a strong association 
between positive father-child relationships and child development, 
along with an alanning rate of deterioration in father-child 
relationships following divorce.74 Legislatures learned of these 
results from advocacy groups and extensive media coverage. 75 
Courts learned about these results through expert witness testimony 
and briefs. 76 After filtering through political process complexities 
and ideological influences, legislatures and courts began interpreting 
a child's best interest as including more frequent contact with fathers 
to offset the loss of daily contact. 77 Also, research that revealed the 
72. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08. 
73. Kelly, supra note 46, at 129. 
74. See, e.g., Nicholas Zill, Donna R. Morrison & Mary J. Coiro, Long-Term Effects of 
Parental Divorce on Parent-Child Relationships, Adjustment, and Achievement in 
Young Adulthood, 7 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 100 (1993) (stating that although grown 
children of divorce were more likely than those from intact families to have a number 
of problems, most were in the normal range on all measures except one: the only 
problem that affected a majority of the divorced group was the quality of relationship 
with their father). Two out of three children of divorce suffered chronically poor 
relationships with their fathers that failed to improve with time. Id. at 96. For a 
review of the literature on the father's role in child development, see HENRY B. 
BILLER, FATHERS AND FAMILIES: PATERNAL FACTORS IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT (1993); 
THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT (Michael E. Lamb ed., 3d ed. 
1997); Ross D. PARKE, FATHERS (1981); WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION, 
supra note 30. It is important to note that social science studies can differ in 
methodology or scientific rigor. When results converge from different studies, using 
different sample selection procedures and different procedures, and few if any studies 
reveal contrary results, scientists have more confidence in the findings. 
75. See Kelly, supra note 46, at 122-23. 
76. See, e.g., Brief of Richard A. Warshak et al. as Amici Curiae on behalf of LaMusga 
Children, In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (No. SI07355), 
available at http://www.warshak.comlpublications/articles-comp.html; Brief for 
Leslie Ellen Shear et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, In re Montenegro v. 
Diaz, 27 P.3d 289 (2001) (No. S090699), available at https:llpublic.me.comllescfls 
(click "LAAC Relocation" then "Montego Amicus Brief.wpd). 
77. See Kelly, supra note 46, at 127-28. 
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harm to children of witnessing their parents' hostile interchanges,78 
eventually found its way into court decisions (and negotiated 
settlements) that put in place parenting plans that minimized contact 
between hostile parents during the child's transition between homes 
(e.g., instead of children going directly from one home to the other, 
one parent takes the children to school in the morning, the other 
parent picks the children up from school in the afternoon). 79 Such 
changes are compatible with, and require no modification of, the 
best-interest standard.80 By contrast, a fixed presumption about 
custody arrangements would not adapt to or benefit from new 
discoveries about how best to help children whose parents live apart 
from each other. 81 
It must be emphasized that the best-interest standard, and 
proposed alternative presumptions such as the approximation rule, 
are default positions that generally come into play only when couples 
are unable to agree on the division of parenting responsibilities and 
take their disputes to court. In the vast majority of cases, parents 
exercise the widest discretion in reaching settlements out of court, 
78. For a review, see Janet R. Johnston, Research Update: Children's Adjustment in Sole 
Custody Compared to Joint Custody Families and Principles for Custody Decision 
Making, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 415,420 (1995). 
79. Joan B. Kelly, Children's Living Arrangements Following Separation and Divorce: 
insights from Empirical and Clinical Research, 46 F AM. PROCESS 35,45 (2007). 
80. See generally Kelly, supra note 46, at 128-29 (discussing the flexibility of the best-
interest rule and determining custody on a case-by-case individualized basis to lower 
conflict). Systematic changes in the way custody decisions are made may not even 
require new legislative public policy statements. See Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 
209, 217 (reviewing studies that report increased rates of joint legal custody and 
fathers' parenting time in Washington, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Maine that occurred 
in the absence of changes in statutes). The authors attribute such changes to parents' 
receptivity to professional guidance and conclude: 
Attaining desirable changes in de jure parenting arrangement 
practice may not require legislation, court rulings or any other 
kind of official imprimatur. Since parents' bargaining appears to 
be strongly affected by the informal guidance they receive from 
judges, custody evaluators, parent educators, and mediators, and 
(especially) attorneys, all that is likely required is a change in this 
informal professional culture of belief. 
id. at 231. 
81. See generally E. Mavis Hetherington & Margaret M. Stanley·Hagan, The Effects of 
Divorce on Fathers and Their Children, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT 191,202 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 3d ed. 1997) (illustrating issues with 
nonresident fathers). 
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and courts typically approve their agreements. 82 But the prevailing 
legal standard influences even out-of-court agreements by creating a 
context for negotiations.83 This context allows each side to weigh 
settlement offers against the perceived likely outcome in court, what 
mediators refer to as the BA TNA (best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement). 84 
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE BEST-INTEREST STANDARD 
Critics lodge four arguments against the best-interest standard. 
1) The best-interest standard "is too subjective to produce 
predictable results"; thus, because the BATNA is so uncertain, 
parents are less likely to reach out-of-court settlements and more 
likely to engage in strategic bargaining and prolonged litigation, all to 
the detriment of children.85 Professor Jon Elster cogently expresses 
this concern: 
82. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 154. Parents' discretion to "privately order" their post-
divorce custody arrangements has some limits. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.06 
reporter's note a. Under the best-interest standard, courts retain the right to reject an 
agreement reached by the parties if the court finds the settlement not in the child's 
best interest. GUGGENHEIM, supra note I, at 154; Levy, supra note II, at 67, 78 (both 
noting that judges rarely set aside agreements reached in uncontested divorces). It is 
noteworthy, though, that the Stanford Child Custody study, ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & 
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF 
CUSTODY 103, 303 (1992), found that in 46% of cases in which both parents requested 
joint physical custody, and the petitions indicated no evidence of parental conflict, the 
court's final decree rejected joint physical custody (with a much higher proportion of 
these cases resulting in maternal custody). Some of the discrepancy between the 
original petitions and the final outcome may be due to changes in family 
circumstances and parental preferences that occurred after the petitions were filed. Id. 
at 103. But some may be due to a judge rejecting the uncontested agreement, either 
because the judge is dubious about joint physical custody, or because of a special ad 
hoc aspect of the arrangement. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.06 reporter's note a. 
An example of why this might occur is the case of a woman whom the court believes 
was intimidated into an agreement to share custody with a violent man. Id. 
Nevertheless, as GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 154, reasons, "Even in the rare 
instance that a court rejects a settlement and imposes a child custody arrangement that 
neither parent wants, parents who agree among themselves need not enforce the order 
once they are out of court." 
83. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 57, at 978. 
84. See WILLIAM URY, THE POWER OF A POSITIVE No: How TO SAY NO AND STILL GET TO 
YES 58 (2007). 
85. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Preference, 
Presumption, Predisposition, and Common Sense: From Traditional Custody 
Doctrines to the American Law Institute's Family Dissolution Project, 36 FAM. L.Q. 
11, 14 (2002) ("The best-interests standard does little to constrain or steer judges; it 
encourages parents to contest custody; and it leaves children vulnerable to the effects 
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The best interest principle increases costs to children in two 
ways. First, more cases will be brought than if there existed 
a strong presumption rule or an automatic decision 
procedure because both parties may persuade themselves 
that they stand a chance of getting custody. Second, for any 
given case that is brought, the legal process will be more 
protracted since it is not simply a case of deciding whether 
one parent is unfit. 86 
103 
Critics assume that an uncertain BA TNA not only increases the 
prevalence of trials and the length of litigation, it encourages abusive 
bargaining in those cases that do settle: 
The greatest damage from the lack of clarity in the law 
occurs in those divorces, the overwhelming majority, that 
are settled by the parties before trial. . .. To the extent that 
it is impossible to get or give sound advice on how a court is 
likely to resolve a given issue-and a large measure of 
discretion means exactly that-the economically stronger 
party gains negotiating leverage from the superior ability to 
prolong negotiation, to engage in expensive pretrial 
discovery, and to use preliminary court appearances for 
harassment. 87 
Professor Martin Guggenheim argues, as does Elster, that any 
clearly defined rule (both seem to prefer a primary caretaker 
presumption) would do the least harm to the fewest children because 
it would reduce the uncertainty of the likely judicial outcome and 
thus spare children the hostilities attendant to adversarial custody 
negotiations and litigation. 88 
of both."); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Reconciling the Primary Caretaker Preference. the 
Joint Custody Preference. and the Case-by-Case Rule, in JOINT CUSTODY & SHARED 
PARENTING 218, 220-21 (Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991); Linda Jellum, Parents Know 
Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody Agreements, 65 OHIO. ST. L.J. 615, 
630 (2004) ("The discretion judges retain under [the best-interest] standard 
encourages litigation. . .. Prior to litigation, the parties cannot know which of two fit 
parents a judge is likely to prefer. Thus, they may refuse to negotiate a settlement 
under the mistaken belief that they will win."). 
86. Elster, supra note 44, at 24. 
87. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and 
Succession Law, 60 TuL. L. REv. 1165, 1170 (1986). 
88. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 172-73; see Elster, supra note 44, at 43-44. 
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2) Because the best-interest standard does not focus exclusively on 
one factor as the basis for decisions or identify which factors will 
carry the most weight in the court's decision, the parties may believe 
that the way to prevail is to engage in broad character 
assassinations.89 The Principles asserts that, under the best-interest 
standard, a parent may attempt "to influence the child, the child's 
teachers, and others to see the other parent in a negative light," 
perhaps even hiring experts to assist in highlighting the other parent's 
flaws. 90 Litigation that sinks to this level leaves a legacy of hostility 
that can, and on many occasions does, undermine subsequent 
effective coparenting.91 
3) The best-interest standard provides courts with broad discretion 
and no guidance or objective basis to choose between two fit 
parents.92 According to Professor David L. Chambers, one of the 
89. See, e.g., Emery, Otto & O'Donahue, supra note 52, at 5-7, 18-19. 
90. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 cmt. c. For a description of the motives and means 
by which parents negatively influence their children's attitudes toward the other 
parent, and the difficulties this creates for their children, see RiCHARD A. W ARSHAK, 
DIVORCE POISON: How TO PROTECT YOUR FAMILY FROM BAD-MOUTHING AND 
BRAINWASHING 79-123 (2010). For preliminary, small-sample studies on the impact 
of such negative parental influence on children, see AMY J.L. BAKER, ADULT 
CHILDREN OF PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: BREAKING THE TIES THAT BIND 
(2007); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, 
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 196 (1989); Aaron J. Hands & 
Richard A. Warshak, Parental Alienation Among College Students, 39 AM. J. FAM. 
THERAPY 45 (2011); Janet R. Johnston, Marjorie G. Walters & Nancy W. Olesen, The 
Psychological Functioning of Alienated Children in Custody Disputing Families: An 
Exploratory Study, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 39 (2005). In its most severe form, 
such malignant parental behavior can result in the complete rupture of the child's 
relationship with the other parent and extended family. There is a vast literature 
covering theories, research, and experience in the fields of child development and 
psychotherapy that demonstrates the handicapping effects of damaged, conflicted, and 
absent parent-child relationships on future psychological adjustment. The principle 
that family-of-origin relationships influence our future relationships and life 
adjustment is not only the foundation of many different schools of psychotherapy and 
developmental psychology, it has reached the status of a truism in contemporary 
culture. The loss is multiplied when the child is unable to receive and share love with 
an entire extended family. 
91. See generally RiCHARD A. GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR 
PARENTS AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1986); CARLA B. GARRITY & 
MITCHELL A. BARIS, CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: PROTECTING THE CHILDREN OF HIGH-
CONFLICT DIVORCE (1994); W ARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION supra note 30; 
W ARSHAK, DIVORCE POISON, supra note 90. 
92. Elster, supra note 44, at 2 ("[T]here usually is no rational basis for preferring one 
parent over another."); see also Robert A. Burk, Experts, Custody Disputes, & Legal 
Fantasies, 14 PSYCHIATRIC Hosp. 140, 141 (1983) ("[T]he attempt to determine which 
parent is the better child custodian depends on such fine-grained distinctions as to 
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advisers to ALI's project, "The concept of 'children's best interests,' 
unlike such concepts as distance or mass, has no objective content.,,93 
Often, courts must choose between different parenting styles and 
between different ideas and values about raising children. 94 An 
indeterminate standard allows decisions based on gender biases, 
subjective value judgments, and speculation in place of objective 
considerations. Professor Robert J. Levy, an adviser to the 
Principles, suggests the possibility that judges might occasionally 
"award custody to those litigants whose attributes and values most 
closely resemble their own.,,95 Even when best-interest criteria are 
explicitly listed, courts are given no guidance in assigning relative 
weights to each factor. 96 Particularly when there is no requirement 
that a list of factors be equally and reasonably considered, judges 
may "support preferential rulings whenever they so desire by 
ignoring those factors which conflict with personal points of view 
and making much ado over those that do not. ,,97 
4) Because the best-interest standard invites an in-depth inquiry, 
critics believe it encourages courts to appoint and depend too heavily 
on mental health professionals who conduct evaluations and offer 
recommendations.98 Such critics further contend that child custody 
evaluators (and courts) operate with no objective definitions of what 
is effective parenting and what are good outcomes for children. 99 
Thus, evaluators lack an objective basis to predict which custody 
arrangements will promote a particular child's best interest in the 
make this, in the context of a custody dispute, a choice between two essentially 
indistinguishable alternatives .... "). 
93. David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in 
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 488 (1984). 
94. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 cmt. c; Barbara A. Atwood, Comment on Warshak: 
The Approximation Rule as a Work in Progress, 1 CHILD. DEV. PERSP. 126, 127 
(2007); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the 
Face of Indeterminancy, LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 260-61 (1975); O'Connell, 
supra note 45, at 130. 
95. Levy, supra note 45, at 197. 
96. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests 
of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody 
Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 13-16, 18 (1985). 
97. Johnson, supra note 19, at 11. 
98. Emery et al., supra note 52, at 19-20. 
99. Timothy M. Tippins & Jeffrey P. Wittman, Symposium Issue on Child Custody 
Evaluation: Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody Recommendations: A Call 
for Clinical Humility and Judicial Vigilance, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 193, 215 (2005); 
Emery, supra note 45, at 133-34. 
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present and the future. 100 In general, critics believe that the best-
interest standard, as currently conceived, is impossible to implement 
and results in over-reliance on inadequate science. 101 As Professor 
Mary Ann Glendon, another adviser to ALI's project, cogently 
argues, "The 'best interests' standard is a prime example of the 
futility of attempting to achieve perfect, individualized justice by 
reposing discretion in a judge .... "102 
v. THE BEST-INTEREST STANDARD AND JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION 
The four central criticisms of the best-interest standard all relate to 
its discretionary quality and the lack of objective and scientifically 
valid rules to guide courts in determining best interests. 103 The value 
of scientifically-based expert contributions to custody decisions is 
debated, and the debate's relevance to the best-interest standard will 
be discussed later in this articie. 104 But there is no doubt that the best-
interest standard does confer broad discretion and that such discretion 
carries the potential for abuse. This concern is central to Robert H. 
Mnookin's lucid and influential critique of the best-interest standard: 
"[B]ecause what is in the best interests of a particular child is 
indeterminate, there is good reason to be offended by the breadth of 
power exercised by a trial court judge in the resolution of custody 
disputes." 105 
Professor Mnookin contrasts the court's task in custody litigation 
with what he terms "traditional adjudication" and he argues that the 
discretion of the best-interest standard is anomalous and unduly 
excessive. 106 In a masterful, balanced, and incisive analysis, though, 
Carl E. Schneider reveals the ubiquity of discretion in American law, 
100. See, e.g., Emery, supra note 45, at 133-34; Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations as 
Evidence in Divorce Cases, 21 FAM. L.Q. 149, 149, 151-52 (1987); Sheila Rush 
Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 1117, 1144-45 (1976); O'Connell, supra note 45, at 130. 
101. Tippins & Wittman, supra note 99, at 215. 
102. Glendon, supra note 87, at 1181 ("Its vagueness provides maximum incentive to those 
who are inclined to wrangle over custody, and it asks the judge to do what is almost 
impossible: evaluate the child-caring capacities of a mother and a father at a time 
when family relations are apt to be most distorted by the stress of separation and the 
divorce process itself."); see also Atwood, supra note 94, at 127; Emery et aI., supra 
note 50; O'Connell, supra note 45, at 130; Tippins & Wittman, supra note 99, at 215. 
103. Emery et aI., supra note 52, at 19. 
104. Id at 23; Tippins & Wittman, supra note 99, at 193, 198, 204; see infra notes 255-62 
and accompanying text. 
105. Mnookin, supra note 94, at 230. 
106. Id at 249-55. 
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and shows that the elements that Mnookin characterizes as 
paradigmatic of custody litigation are common to other areas of law, 
such as nuisance law and public law. 107 For instance, Mnookin views 
traditional adjudication as usually focused on "the determination of 
past acts and facts," whereas custody adjudication focuses on a 
prediction of the future and on the character of people. 108 Professor 
Schneider counters that "[n]uisance law does require a detennination 
of past acts, but often it also requires a determination of the future 
effects of various possible remedies.,,109 Schneider quotes Professor 
Abram Chayes's work on public law litigation to make a similar 
point: "In public law litigation, '[t]he fact inquiry is not historical and 
adjudicative but predictive and legislative,' and the decree that 
concludes that litigation often 'seeks to adjust future behavior, not to 
compensate for past wrong. ",110 Even Mnookin recognizes other 
areas in which courts focus broad discretion on "person-oriented" 
issues, such as in sentencing, pretrial detention, and-an issue 
drawing considerable attention at the time of this writing-preventive 
detention. III As with custody detenninations, decisions on these 
matters carry significant and long-tenn impacts on the litigants and 
the litigants' families. 112 
Professor Frederick Schauer provides a broader context in which 
to consider the role of discretion in American law by describing a 
tradition and legal theory with roots in "American Legal Realism" 
and Aristotle's concept of equity: 
The tradition starts with an intuitively appealing goal-
getting this case just right. But that goal and the tradition 
embracing it are in tension with the very idea of a rule, for 
implicit in rule-based adjudication is a tolerance for some 
proportion of wrong results, results other than the results 
that would be reached, all things other than the rule 
considered, for the case at hand. In many of the most 
important areas of American adjudication, the tolerance for 
107. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2239-42. 
108. Mnookin, supra note 94, at 249, 251. 
109. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2240. It must be noted, though, that nuisance law does 
not carry the personal and emotional aspect endemic to custody disputes. See 
generally GARDNER, supra note 91. 
110. Id. at 2241 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Abram Chayes, The 
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302, 1298 
(1976». 
Ill. See Mnookin, supra note 94, at 251-52 (footnotes omitted). 
112. See id. at 252-53. 
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the wrong answer has evaporated, often for good reason, 
and the current paradigm for adjudication in the American 
legal culture may already have departed from rule-bound 
decisionmaking. This new paradigm instead stresses the 
importance not of deciding the case according to the rule, 
but of tailoring the rule to fit the case. . .. [B]ecause this 
new jurisprudence treats what look like rules as 
continuously subject to molding in order best to maintain 
the purposes behind those rules in the face of a changing 
world, we can say that what emerges is a jurisprudence not 
of rules but of reasons. 113 
Whether or not the court's discretionary authority in custody 
adjudication is anomalous or well within the mainstream of American 
jurisprudence, Schneider persuasively argues that judicial discretion 
is "less unfettered and menacing than it initially appears.,,114 He 
catalogs a range of informal deterrents to abuse of discretion, 
including self-imposed constraints; concern about the opinions of 
colleagues, journalists, and the public at large; the influence of social 
norms; the acquisition of habits of thought in law school that restrict 
the kinds of decisions a judge will consider acceptable; hearing 
evidence that carries the moral force of a disinterested party such as 
that provided by a guardian ad litem; and an aversion to having one's 
ruling reversed by a higher court. 115 These constraints are in addition 
to the more formal checks on discretion such as those placed by court 
rules, procedural and evidentiary limitations, legislative mandates, 
case law or statutory custody guidelines, restrictions, and policy 
(which, e.g., may oblige judges to explain the rationale for custody 
decisions 116), the hierarchy of courts that oversee lower courts' 
procedures and rulings, and periodic reselection of judges. 117 
The ubiquity of discretion and limits on its exercise suggest, but 
do not prove, that discretion is inevitable (about which there is 
limited dispute) and desirable (about which there is enormous 
113. Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REv. 847,847 (1987) 
(reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986». 
114. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2218. 
115. Jd. at 2254-59. 
116. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 2006) ("The court must make detailed 
findings on each of the factors and explain how the factors led to its conclusions and 
to the determination of the best interests of the child."). Nevertheless, this need not 
constrain the influence of personal biases. According to Professor Levy (personal 
communication, Mar. 12, 2009): "Ask (as I do) a group of students to write an opinion 
on each side ofa specific custody dispute-they have no trouble." 
117. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2258-60. 
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dispute). I 18 Most legal scholars recognize that the issue is not a 
choice between rules and discretion. 119 Rather, the search is for the 
optimal balance between the two, a mix that maximizes advantages 
while minimizing disadvantages. 12o This leaves us with the question 
of whether the benefits of broad discretion in contemporary custody 
adjudication outweigh the drawbacks, and-more to the point-
whether a more determinate rule can adequately address legitimate 
concerns about the best-interest standard while avoiding hazards such 
as an unacceptable degree of harm to children's welfare. This is the 
topic we take up next. 
VI. PROPOSALS FOR DETERMINATE CUSTODY 
STANDARDS 
Critics of the best-interest standard advise a return to firm legal 
rules and presumptions as a remedy for the perceived problems of an 
indeterminate standard. 121 Some scholars propose a resurrection of 
the maternal custody presumption. 122 Others seek to place special 
emphasis on one factor chosen from a list of criteria that comprise a 
multi-factored best-interest inquiry.123 For scholars who identify 
themselves as "children's rights advocates," the chosen factor is the 
preferences of a child who has reached a specific age. 124 Others 
emphasize the criterion of which parent is most apt to foster the 
child's relationship with the other parent, sometimes referred to as 
the "friendly parent doctrine.,,125 
118. Id. at 2239. 
119. Id. at 2217-19. 
120. Id. at 2218-19. 
121. See Patrick Parkinson, The Past Caretaking Standard in Comparative Perspective, in 
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF F AMIL Y DISSOLUTION 446, 449 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). 
122. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo and Child Custody, 1 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 139 (1992); Martha Minow, Consider the 
Consequences, 84 MICH. L. REV. 900, 908 (1986); Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights 
and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 107, 130 
(1978). 
123. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 152. 
124. See, e.g., Federle, supra note 48, at 440; Kandel, supra note 48, at 361. 
125. For discussion and critique of the "friendly parent" doctrine, including the conclusion 
that it does not solve the problem of indeterminancy, see Margaret K. Dare, The 
"Friendly Parent" Concept: A Flawed Factor for Child Custody, 6 Loy. 1. PUB. INT. 
L. 41, 42 (2004). 
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A. Primary Caretaker Presumption 
A proposal that has attracted considerable support as a 
replacement for a multi-factored best-interest inquiry is a 
presumption in favor of the parent who is designated the primary 
caretaker (sometimes referred to as the primary parent) based on the 
pre-separation history of childcare. 126 Some commentators assert that 
the primary caretaker presumption closely resembles the 
approximation rule in cases where one parent can be shown to have 
devoted a majority of caretaking time in the past. 127 But a key 
difference is that the primary caretaker presumption requires only 
that a litigant demonstrate who provided the most care in order to be 
named the parent with primary custody. 128 The approximation rule 
induces litigants to document the exact percentage of care in order to 
earn a larger share of custody (and perhaps a commensurate share of 
child support).129 Nevertheless, many of the arguments for and 
against the primary caretaker presumption apply equally to the 
approximation rule. 130 Therefore, a more detailed analysis of these 
arguments is reserved for the subsequent examination of the 
approximation rule. 
Briefly, those in favor of a primary caretaker presumption argue 
that it 1) is a determinate standard that will reduce litigation rates and 
hostile, manipulative negotiations; 2) is gender-neutral; 3) protects 
the child's relationship with the parent who is most central to the 
child's emotional welfare; and 4) recognizes that the parent who has 
the most experience providing childcare is the one who will most 
competently manage these responsibilities after divorce. 131 Those 
who oppose a primary caretaker presumption argue that it 1) may fuel 
hostile litigation by provoking disputes over which parent is 
"primary"; 2) favors mothers despite its gender-neutral language; 3) 
126. Those favoring a primary caretaker presumption include Chambers, supra note 93, at 
478-79 (for preschool children); Fineman, supra note 46, at 773-74; Glendon, supra 
note 87, at 1182; Johnson, supra note 19, at 4-5; Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective 
Recognition 0/ Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 7 (2008); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent 
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics a/Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 168, 185-
86 (1984). 
127. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 480; see also Parkinson, supra note 121, at 449 ("To the 
extent that the past caretaker standard is used to select who should be the primary 
caregiver, it is indistinguishable from the primary caretaker presumption."). 
128. See Parkinson, supra note 121, at 449. 
129. See id. at 454. 
130. See id. at 449. 
131. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 87, at 1182; Parkinson, supra note 121, at 454-55. 
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relies on a distinction between primary and secondary parent that is 
meaningless, particularly for children beyond preschool age; 4) 
ignores changes in the family that occur after divorce; and 5) elevates 
quantity over quality of care and mistakenly assumes that the amount 
of time a parent spends with a child is an index of the parent's 
importance to the child, of the quality of their relationship, and of the 
parent's competence in child-rearing. 132 
B. Joint Custody Presumption 
Other than the primary caretaker presumption, the proposal that 
has garnered the most attention is one that bypasses the list of best-
interest criteria. Instead of emphasizing one factor, the proposal calls 
for a default presumption of joint physical custody, with the exact 
division of the child's time between parents varying among 
proposals, ranging from undefined to an equal split. 133 
Supporters of a joint physical custody presumption believe that it 
1) is a determinate, win-win standard that will reduce litigation rates 
and hostile, manipulative negotiations, 2) avoids gender bias, 3) 
recognizes the value of, and promotes, the child's relationship with 
both parents, 4) is associated with better outcomes for children, 5) is 
preferred by most children and the public, and 6) protects the rights 
of both parents. 134 Critics of a joint physical custody presumption 
believe that it 1) requires a level of cooperation that is not feasible for 
parents who cannot agree on custody, 2) favors fathers by giving 
those who do not genuinely want this much parenting responsibility 
an advantage in negotiations, 3) disrupts the stability and continuity 
of care provided by the child's historical primary caretaker, 4) 
increases the child's harmful exposure to ongoing parental conflict, 
5) is impractical because it requires divorced parents to live in close 
proximity to each other, and 6) exposes children to violence and 
abuse. 135 
132. Those opposing the primary caretaker presumption include Kelly, supra note 46, at 
136; Schneider, supra note 46, at 2283 (for an exceptionally thoughtful analysis); 
Smith, supra note 46, at 746; Warshak, supra note 46, at 125. 
133. For discussions of the arguments for and against joint physical custody see W ARSHAK, 
THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 177. 
134. Jay Folberg, Custody Overview, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 12-13 
(Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991); W ARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION supra note 30, 
at 177-205. 
135. Arguing against a joint custody presumption, Sanders, in an otherwise thoughtful and 
scholarly analysis, unfortunately cites an advocacy group's citation of a 1996 
(incorrectly cited as 1999) report, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass 'N, VIOLENCE AND THE 
FAMILY: REpORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK 
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Advocates of the primary caretaker presumption and the joint 
physical custody presumption share the goal of replacing the 
discretion inherent in the best-interest standard with a bright-line rule 
or a rebuttable presumption. 136 One proposal is seen as favoring most 
mothers; the other is seen as favoring most fathers. 137 Perhaps 
FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY (1996), to support an alarming wholesale 
indictment of family courts: "Abusive parents are more likely to seek sole custody 
than nonviolent ones and are successful about 70% of the time." Molly Sanders, 
Should Child Custody Awards Be Based on Past Caretaking? The Effect of the 
Approximation Standard Ten Years After its Adoption, 30 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. 1. 17, 25 
(2010). Before sounding the alarm of a national epidemic of judges placing children 
with known abusers, it is important to note that the task force has been criticized for 
allowing bias and an advocacy agenda to shape their report. This criticism is 
supported by the American Psychological Association (APA)'s subsequent 
repudiation of the report. A request addressed to the AP A for a copy of the report, or 
for a location where the report could be viewed on the APA Website, received the 
following reply: "Thanks for your interest in the AP A 1996 report. It is no longer 
available because it is outdated and needs review. AP A has no plans to review and 
reprint it." Email from Julia M. Silva, Director, Violence Prevention Office, Pub. 
Interest Directorate, Am. Psychological Ass'n, to Richard A. Warshak, Clinical 
Professor, Div. of Clinical Psychology, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. (Dec. 14,2010, 
10:35 CT) (on file with author). A similar response from the APA is found at Glenn 
Sacks, American Psychological Association Distances Itself from Old AP A 
Publication, FATHERS AND FAMILIES (Mar. 6, 2011), 
http://www.fathersandfamilies.org/?p=13578. For strong evidence that judges are not 
delivering children into the hands of abusive parents and that the 1996 report is far off 
the mark in concluding that 70% of violent spouses prevail in custody trials, see T.K. 
Logan, Robert Walker, Leah S. Horvath & Carl Leukefeld, Divorce, Custody, and 
Spousal Violence: A Random Sample of Circuit Court Docket Records, 18 J. FAM. 
VIOLENCE 269, 274-75 (2003). These well-known authorities on domestic violence 
report on a random sample of divorce cases. Of thirty-two cases with spousal 
violence, only five were decided in a trial and, of those, all were decided in favor of 
the mother (four sole custody and one joint custody with mother as the primary 
residential parent). Of the remaining twenty-seven cases that settled without a trial, 
twenty-four were decided in favor of the mother, one received joint legal custody with 
equal residential time, and three were decided in favor of the father. Id. In this 
sample, 11 % of the domestic violence orders were petitioned by fathers, so it is likely 
that the 9% decided in favor of fathers reflect the few cases in which the father 
received a domestic violence order against the mother. Id. But see T.K. Logan, 
Robert Walker, Carol E. Jordan & Leah S. Horvath, Child Custody Evaluations and 
Domestic Violence: Case Comparisons, 17 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 719, 737 (2002) 
(expressing concern about violent parents receiving weekly access to, but not custody 
of, their children). 
136. See Elster supra note 44, at 7, 11-12, 14-15, 21; Chambers supra note 93, at 481, 
559, 568-69; Fineman supra note 46, at 727-29, 770; Glendon supra note 87, at 
1180, 1182-83, 1195; Laufer-Ukeles supra note 126, at 18-20, 22, 47-50, 65-66; 
W ARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 177-205. 
137. See Chambers supra note 93, at 481; GUGGENHEIM supra note 1, at 148-51. 
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Schneider is correct in suggesting that "the driving force" behind 
family law refonn "has not been so much a distrust of discretion as a 
dissatisfaction with some specific results that courts have been 
reaching and a desire to alter those results by whatever method comes 
most easily to hand.,,138 
In the real world of crowded dockets, with limited funds for 
comprehensive custody evaluations and legal representation, a rule 
has strong appeal. It promises to clarify the expected outcome of 
trials and thus promote settlements, remove some incentives for 
protracted and hostile negotiations and thus relieve children's 
exposure to toxic levels of conflict, and expedite the court's 
processing of cases that fail to settle. No serious scholar believes that 
a custody rule will work best for all children. Rather, the assumption 
is that such a rule will work best for most children. 139 
VII. THE APPROXIMATION RULE: PRESUMPTION, 
EXCEPTIONS, AND DEFINITION OF CARETAKING 
A. The Presumption and Its Exceptions 
Responding to the call for a rule that can be applied automatically 
and that bypasses judicial discretion, the Principles adopts an idea 
first articulated in a seminal article by Professor Elizabeth S. Scott. 140 
The proposal directs courts to look to the family's past to decide 
contested physical custody cases: "[T]he court should allocate 
custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custodial time the 
child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time 
each parent spent perfonning caretaking functions for the time prior 
to the parents' separation .... "141 The same sentence that sets out the 
approximation rule continues with elaborations that expand the 
court's discretion, and two paragraphs later, the Principles 
reintroduces an indetenninate best-interest standard, albeit with an 
emphasis on past caretaking. 142 Such elaborations fulfill Professor 
138. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2231. 
139. Elster, supra note 44, at 24-25 (explaining that a maternal-preference rule would 
benefit children who would do best in the custody of their mother, as well as those 
who should be in the custody of their father but for whom the emotional toll of 
custody litigation would outweigh the benefits of a father-custody disposition). 
140. Scott, supra note 42, at 617-19, 630, 637-38. 
141. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1). 
142. Id. § 2.08(3) ("If the court is unable to allocate custodial responsibility under 
Paragraph (I) because there is no history of past performance of caretaking functions, 
as in the case of a newborn, or because the history does not establish a sufficiently 
clear pattern of caretaking, the court should allocate custodial responsibility based on 
114 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 41 
Schneider's prediction, twenty-one years earlier, regarding the 
attempt to abandon discretion in custody adjudication: "We will see 
that, once you establish an apparently flat rule like the primary 
caretaker standard, you immediately run into conflicting interests and 
arguments that can only be accommodated by writing ever more 
elaborate rules or by conceding judges some discretion.,,143 
The past-caretaking presumption is overcome as needed to fulfill 
at least one of the following objectives enumerated by the Principles: 
(a) to permit the child to have a relationship with each 
parent which, in the case of a legal parent or a parent by 
estoppel who has performed a reasonable share of parenting 
functions, should be not less than a presumptive amount of 
custodial time set by a uniform rule of statewide 
application; 
(b) to accommodate the firm and reasonable preferences 
of a child who has reached a specific age, set by a uniform 
rule of statewide application; 
(c) to keep siblings together when the court finds that 
doing so is necessary to their welfare; 
(d) to protect the child's welfare when the presumptive 
allocation under this section would harm the child because 
of a gross disparity in the quality of the emotional 
attachment between each parent and the child or in each 
parent's demonstrated ability or availability to meet the 
child's needs; 
(e) to take into account any prior agreement, other than 
one under § 2.06, that would be appropriate to consider in 
light of the circumstances as a whole, including the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, the extent to which 
they could have reasonably anticipated the events that 
occurred and their significance, and the interests of the 
child; 
(f) to avoid an allocation of custodial responsibility that 
would be extremely impractical or that would interfere 
substantially with the child's need for stability in light of 
economic, physical, or other circumstances, including the 
distance between the parents' residences, the cost and 
difficulty of transporting the child, each parent's and the 
the child's best interests, taking into account the factors and considerations that are set 
forth in this Chapter, preserving to the extent possible this section's priority on the 
share of past caretaking functions each parent performed."). 
143. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2283. 
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child's daily schedules, and the ability of the parents to 
cooperate in the arrangements; 
(g) to apply the Principles set forth in § 2.17 (4) if one 
parent relocates or proposes to relocate at a distance that 
will impair the ability of a parent to exercise the 
presumptive amount of custodial responsibility under this 
section .144 , 
(h) to avoid substantial and almost certain harm to the 
child. 145 
115 
The application of the approximation rule, with its exceptions, is 
further limited by the requirements of § 2.11 to protect the child and 
the child's parent from domestic violence and other serious parental 
failures. 146 The other serious parental failures include child abuse, 
substance abuse, and persistent interference with a parent's access to 
the child.147 
B. Parenting Versus Caretaking Functions 
To evaluate the approximation-rule proposal and its chances of 
achieving widespread acceptance, it is essential to understand what 
the Principles includes and excludes from the definition of caretaking 
functions. 148 Tasks that are regarded as parenting functions but 
excluded from caretaking functions (i.e., a parent's investment in 
these tasks has no bearing on the allocation of physical custody) 
include 
( a) providing economic support; 
(b) participating in decisionmaking regarding the child's 
welfare; 
(c) maintaining or improving the family residence, 
including yard work, and house cleaning; 
(d) doing and arranging for financial planning and 
organization, car repair and maintenance, food and clothing 
purchases, laundry and dry cleaning, and other tasks 
144. See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2. 17(4)(a) ("The court should allow a parent 
who has been exercising the clear majority of custodial responsibility to relocate with 
the child if that parent shows that the relocation is for a valid purpose, in good faith, 
and to a location that is reasonable in light of the purpose."). 
145. Id. § 2.08(1). 
146. See id. § 2.11. 
147. Id.§2.11(1). 
148. See id. § 2.08(1). 
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supporting the consumption and savings needs of the 
household. 149 
Parenting functions that are considered caretaking functions for 
the purpose of the approximation rule (i.e., the proportion of time a 
parent invested in these activities serves as the basis for the allocation 
of custodial time with the child) are 
tasks that involve interaction with the child or that direct, 
arrange, and supervise the interaction and care provided by 
others. Caretaking functions include but are not limited to 
all of the following: 
(a) satisfying the nutritional needs of the child, managing 
the child's bedtime and wake-up routines, caring for the 
child when sick or injured, being attentive to the child's 
personal hygiene needs including washing, grooming, and 
dressing, playing with the child and arranging for recreation, 
protecting the child's physical safety, and providing 
transportation; 
(b) directing the child's various developmental needs, 
including the acquisition of motor and language skills, toilet 
training, self-confidence, and maturation; 
(c) providing discipline, giving instruction in manners, 
assigning and supervising chores, and performing other 
tasks that attend to the child's needs for behavioral control 
and self-restraint; 
(d) arranging for the child's education, including 
remedial or special services appropriate to the child's needs 
and interests, communicating with teachers and counselors, 
and supervising homework; 
( e) helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate 
interpersonal relationships with peers, siblings, and other 
family members; 
(f) arranging for health-care providers, medical follow-
up, and home health care; 
(g) providing moral and ethical guidance; 
(h) arranging alternative care by a family member, 
babysitter, or other child-care provider or facility, including 
investigation of alternatives, communication with providers, 
and supervision of care. ISO 
149. Id. § 2.03(6). 
150. Id. § 2.03(5). 
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VIII. THE APPROXIMATION RULE: GOALS, RATIONALE, 
AND ASSUMPTIONS 
A. Default Rulefor Trials, BA TNA for Negotiations 
117 
The Principles emphasizes that the approximation rule is a default 
rule to be used only in disputes decided by a court. 151 As with the 
best-interest standard, the approximation rule would provide a 
backdrop for negotiations. 152 In fact, the Principles explicitly 
encourages parents to reach agreements within the negotiating 
context set by the approximation rule. 153 If the rule works as 
intended, it would have the following impact on the settlement 
process. The approximation rule would tilt negotiations regarding 
custody, and issues related to custody such as child support, in favor 
of the parent who is asking for a division of the child's time that is in 
line with the apparent past division of time. For instance, if the 
mother seeks a majority oftime with the children and the father seeks 
an equal division of time, and both sides agree that the court is likely 
to find that the parents contributed equal time to caretaking functions 
in the past, this would give leverage to the father in the negotiations. 
On the other hand, the rule disadvantages spouses who want to 
expand their contacts with their children after the marital 
separation. 154 
F or the approximation rule to have the intended impact on the 
bargaining context, two assumptions must be made. The first 
assumption is that the parties will agree on the proportion of time that 
each has contributed to the caretaking tasks defined by the Principles, 
or at least agree on how the court is likely to decide this issue. The 
second assumption is that neither party to the custody dispute will 
raise any of the exceptions that trump the application of the 
approximation rule. These assumptions are examined in the 
subsequent analysis of the rationale presented by the Principles for 
the proposed reforms. 
151. See id. ch. 1, topic 1, at 8-10. 
152. ld. § 2.08 cmt. a ("This section states the criteria for allocating custodial responsibility 
between parents when they have not reached their own agreement about this 
allocation. These criteria also establish the bargaining context for parents seeking 
agreement."). 
153. ld. 
154. Levy, supra note 11, at 76. 
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B. Refinement or Replacement of the Best-Interest Standard? 
Despite its explicit intent to dislodge the best-interest standard and 
substitute a past-caretaking standard, the Principles characterizes the 
approximation rule as a clarification and refinement, rather than a 
radical reform and replacement, of the best-interest standard. 155 
The historical context provided earlier identifies two essential 
defining features that differentiate the best-interest standard from its 
predecessors. First, it places a priority on children's welfare over 
parental entitlements. 156 Second, it confers broad discretion on the 
court, a discretion that, since the latter third of the twentieth century, 
is usually exercised via a multi-factored individualized inquiry as 
originally envisioned in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. 157 
The approximation rule shares the first defining characteristic of 
the best-interest standard: its primary objective is "to serve the child's 
best interests,,,158 with a subsidiary objective of achieving "fairness 
between the parents.,,159 But it directly contradicts the second 
defining characteristic of the best-interest standard: judicial discretion 
with the intent to promulgate individualized custody decisions. 160 
Rather than lodging broad discretion with the court, the 
approximation rule overtly aims to limit the court's discretion and 
restrict the process of custody adjudication to a single desideratum. 161 
Lacking the second defining feature of the best-interest standard, it is 
conceptually untenable to attach this term to a rule that is its 
conceptual opposite. Fundamentally, the approximation rule does not 
supplement the best-interest standard. It supplants it. 
ALI posits the approximation rule as a more reliable means of 
securing children's welfare, and, thus, it is understandable that we are 
asked to regard the rule as possessing the moral cachet associated 
with the best-interest standard. 162 But the virtue of the prevailing 
standard is found in its individualized, as opposed to formulaic, 
treatment of children and families. The approximation rule forfeits 
its claim to this virtue because it does not merely clarify or refine the 
level of judicial discretion that secures the virtue; it severely restricts 
155. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 emt. e ("Chapter 2 attempts to clarify and refine the 
best-interests standard rather than to eliminate it."). 
156. /d. § 2.02(2) emt. b. 
157. Id. § 2.02(1). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. § 2.02(2). 
160. Id. § 2.02 emt. c. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. §§ 2.02 cmt. d, 2.06 (1), (3). 
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it. 163 This does not mean that the approximation rule lacks virtue. 
But whatever virtues the rule may possess, an individualized broad-
brush approach for adjudicating custody disputes is not one of them. 
e. Rationale 
The approximation rule improves upon earlier custody 
presumptions in two important respects. It is gender-neutral rather 
than gender-centered. l64 And instead of imposing one template on all 
families, the approximation rule is pluralistic, in the sense that each 
family's custodial allocation is based on its own historical pattern of 
caretaking. 165 As the Principles' reporter notes: 
In effect, it amounts to a primary caretaker presumption 
when one parent has been exercising a substantial majority 
of the past caretaking, and it amounts to a joint custody 
presumption when past caretaking has been shared equally 
in the past. It responds to all variations and combinations of 
past caretaking patterns between those two poles, declining 
to impose some average, idealized family form on all 
families and instead favoring solutions that roughly 
approximate the caretaking shares each parent assumed 
before the divorce or before the custody issue arose. 166 
The Principles regards the approximation rule as an optimal 
solution to the problems critics attribute to the discretionary nature of 
the best-interest standard. 167 Furthermore, the hope is that the rule 
will be palatable to interest groups that take an ever-increasingly 
powerful role in shaping family law legislation. 168 In addition to 
gender-neutrality and pluralism, the Principles offers several 
arguments for relying on past caretaking: 
1) The amount of time invested in past caretaking is a determinate 
standard that makes the outcome of a custody trial more 
predictable. 169 This makes it more likely that parents will reach an 
163. Jd. 
164. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 480-81. 
165. Jd. at 479-80. 
166. Jd. at 480; see also Atwood, supra note 94, at 126 (discussing the rule's pluralism). 
167. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 482. 
168. See id. at 472. 
169. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b. 
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agreement without the financial and emotional costs of a trial. 170 It is 
commonly believed that custody litigation escalates conflict, so the 
hope is that a determinate standard will ultimately benefit children by 
reducing their harmful exposure to parental conflict. 171 
2) The approximation rule not only promotes settlements, it 
creates a clear BATNA that facilitates less protracted and more 
amicable negotiations with less opportunity for strategic, 
manipulative bargaining. 172 
3) In cases that fail to settle, the approximation rule reduces the 
complexity and length of trials by restricting the scope of fact-finding 
to a single, relatively easy to measure, factor. 173 This reduces the 
need for costly, comprehensive custody evaluations and expert 
witnesses. 174 Revealing a jaundiced view of the contributions of 
mental health experts to custody litigation, the ALI believes, 
"Avoiding expert testimony is desirable because such testimony, 
within an adversarial context, tends to focus on the weaknesses of 
each parent and thus undermines the spirit of cooperation and 
compromise necessary to successful post-divorce custodial 
arrangements .... "175 
4) The parents' past decision about how to divide caretaking time 
is the best guide to what the parents would decide if they were 
functioning rationally and focused on their child's interests during 
their custody negotiations. 176 Additionally, the approximation rule 
facilitates effective negotiations because "[t]he way the parents chose 
to divide responsibility when the family lived together anchors the 
negotiations in their own lived experience rather than in unrealistic or 
emotion-based aspirations about the future.,,177 
5) The Principles recognizes that any determinate standard carries 
the potential to simplify, expedite, and reduce the incidence of trials 
and protracted negotiations. 178 The goal, though, is to obtain a 
determinate standard's benefits while retaining a focus on children's 
welfare. 179 The Principles believes that the approximation rule 
170. Bartlett, supra note 85, at 19 ("[T]he past caretaking standard makes it easier for 
parents to predict the outcome of a case and, thus, more likely to settle the case earlier 
and more amicably."). 
17l. See id. at 13, 19. 
172. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b. 
173. Jd. 
174. See Bartlett, supra note 85, at 19. 
175. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 emt. b. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. 
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accomplishes this elusive feat. 180 It assumes that the quantity of past 
caretaking is an adequate proxy for qualitative aspects of children's 
best interests that are difficult to measure. 181 Specifically, the 
Principles assumes that the difference between the parents in the 
amount of time that each cared for the child in the past is an index of 
the difference in 1) the strength of the child's emotional ties to each 
parent, 2) the quality of the child's relationship with each parent, 3) 
the parents' relative competence to raise children, and 4) the parents' 
motivation to put the child's interests first. 182 The Principles 
recognizes limitations of this index, but prefers a rule to the 
prevailing standard in which expert testimony and judicial discretion 
are seen as intolerably subjective. 183 
If the assumptions underlying the approximation rule were 
accurate, there is no doubt that the rule would represent a child-
friendly improvement on the best-interest standard. But seen in the 
light of relevant social science literature and a realistic view of the 
socio-Iegal context of custody disputes, it becomes clear that the 
approximation rule will not-indeed cannot-deliver on its promises. 
IX. ANALYZING THE RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS OF 
THE APPROXIMATION RULE 
A. Gender-Neutrality Versus the Perception of Gender Bias 
Regardless of how beneficial a legal reform would be in practice, 
it must be politically palatable if it is to enjoy acceptance by state 
legislatures and application by courts. Discussing the anemic judicial 
response to West Virginia's legislated approximation rule, Professor 
Sanders observes that, "The success of the standard will also depend 
upon the support of various interest groupS.,,184 The approximation 
rule was conceived as a rapprochement between the primary 
180. See id. 
181. Id. § 2.08 cmt. b. 
182. Id. ch. 1, topic 1, subch. II, pt. c ("How caretaking was divided in the past provides a 
relatively concrete point of reference which is likely to reflect various qualitative 
factors that are otherwise very hard to measure, including the strength of the 
emotional ties between the child and each parent, relative parental competencies, and 
the willingness of each parent to put the child's interests first."); see also id. § 2.08 
cmt. b ("It assumes that the division of past caretaking functions correlates well with 
other factors associated with the child's best interests, such as the quality of each 
parent's emotional attachment to the child and the parents' respective parenting 
abilities. "). 
183. See id. 
184. Sanders, supra note 135, at 26. 
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caretaker presumption advocated by mothers' rights groups and a 
joint custody presumption advocated by fathers' rights groups. 185 
Like the best-interest standard, the approximation rule is gender-blind 
in its language. 186 But as history has shown with the best-interest 
standard, gender-neutral statutes can be implemented in a gender-
biased manner. 
In evaluating its political viability, it is relevant that most 
commentators, including advisers to the ALI Principles, are 
convinced that the rule would tilt the negotiating field and trial 
outcome in favor of the mother. 187 Recalling Schneider's suggestion 
that proposals to restrict judicial discretion in custody cases are 
motivated by the desire for a particular outcome, and given the 
legislative trend toward joint custody statutes, the approximation rule 
may be seen as a move in the direction of reversing the trend and 
establish a bargaining context that favors mothers, in addition to its 
goal of reducing indeterminacy.188 If so, Professor Guggenheim's 
analysis of the primary caretaker presumption may fit the 
approximation rule: "The primary caretaker presumption was offered 
as a gender-neutral way to achieve the same result the maternal 
preference yielded. Its transparency was hard to miss. It was 
promulgated by interested parties who knew ahead of time who 
would benefit most by its use.,,189 Guggenheim predicts "that more 
women will back the approximation presumption than men. Women 
will appreciate how they will gain if the presumption became law; 
men will understand how they will lose both leverage in negotiating a 
divorce settlement and the prospects of securmg custody 
185. See Scott, supra note 42, at 615-16, 628,630-32. 
186. See SCHEPARD, supra note 61, at 162, 167. 
187. See, e.g., Shelley A. Riggs, Is the Approximation Rule in the Child's Best Interests? A 
Critique from the Perspective of Attachment Theory, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 481, 489 
(2005) ("[B]ecause the working parent in contemporary society is most often the 
father, the approximation rule may be unfairly biased against fathers and end up 
resembling little more than the maternal preference standard of the past."); Herma Hill 
Kay, No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody: Chilling Out the Gender Wars, 36 FAM. 
L.Q. 27,43 (2002) ("[The Principles'] list of caretaking functions ... is likely to spell 
mother in many, if not most, households."); Margaret F. Brinig, Feminism and Child 
Custody Under Chapter Two of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 301, 302, 313 (2001) (declaring 
that "feminist principles permeate the Chapter" and including an entire section on 
"selling" the ALI PRINCIPLES to men). 
188. Cf Kay, supra note 187, at 38. This esteemed scholar and adviser to the PRINCIPLES 
believes that the rule was "crafted by women" as an alternative to joint custody, which 
they perceive as the "handiwork of men." Id. at 27,38. 
189. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 150. 
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themselves.,,19o Professor Levy groups the approximation rule with 
the primary caretaker standard and the maternal deference standards 
as proposals "which seem to route the law implicitly in the direction 
of the maternal presumption of earlier days.,,191 
The charge that the approximation rule masks a maternal 
preference presumption is answered by the primary draftsperson and 
reporter of the Principles' chapter on custody, Professor Kathleen 
Bartlett: "A parent who obtains a greater share of custodial time 
because of a more extensive prior role as the caretaking parent does 
so not because of the court's gender bias but because of the parents' 
own past choices about the best way to care for the child.,,192 
Other proponents of the approximation rule correctly point out that 
it would benefit fathers who assume more responsibility for child-
care during the marriage, in some cases allocating more time than 
they would receive under the best-interest standard. 193 Emery cites 
190. Jd. at 151. However, to be most accurate, we should not equate the interests and 
preferences of mothers in a custody dispute with those of all women. Women in the 
father's life other than the divorcing spouse, such as his mother, sisters, and friends, 
may favor a standard that gives the father more time with his children. Also, some 
women who identifY themselves as feminists favor custody rules that encourage less 
traditional gender-based divisions of parenting roles. See, e.g., CATHY YOUNG, 
CEASEFIRE!: WHY WOMEN AND MEN MUST JOIN FORCES TO ACHIEVE TRUE EQUALITY 
211,213,217-19 (1999). 
191. Levy, supra note 11, at 88. 
192. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 481; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, u.s. Custody Law and 
Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. 
J. SOC. POL'y & L. 5, 18 (2002) ("The ALI past-caretaking standard ... is indifferent 
to the nature of the past-caretaking arrangements."). In Richard A. Warshak, The 
Approximation Rule, Child Development Research, and Children's Best Interests 
After Divorce, 1 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 119, 123 (2007) and in Warshak, supra note 16, 
at 618 n.67, I mistakenly cited this quote to emphasize the rule's disregard of quality 
of care in favor of an exclusive focus on quantity of care. However, upon reviewing 
the context while preparing this article, it is clear that this particular statement 
regarding indifference is intended to underscore the fact that the rule makes no 
assumptions about the nature of past divisions of child-care. Although, as [ show 
subsequently, the rule is indifferent to the quality of care except in the extreme cases 
of child abuse or neglect, the indifference referred to in the above sentence clearly has 
a separate connotation. See also Atwood, supra note 94, at 127 ("[the approximation 
rule] will favor women only to the extent that parents adhere to traditional gender 
roles."). 
193. Atwood, supra note 94, at 126; see also O'Connell, supra note 45, at 130 (noting that 
the approximation rule would reward the increasing number of fathers in dual-earner 
households who provide primary child-care); Fabricius et ai., supra note 34, at 213. 
In a representative sample of Arizona citizens who responded to a hypothetical 
custody case in which the mother and father provided equal amounts of child-care 
before the divorce, more than 75% thought that courts would award mothers most of 
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national survey data to predict that the approximation rule would give 
the average father more than 120 nights annually with his children, 
the equivalent of joint physical custody. 194 
I include this brief discussion of gender implications because the 
subject invariably arises when the merits of the approximation rule 
are debated and, the issue is important in assessing the odds of the 
rule's widespread adoption. But the question of whether the 
approximation rule is likely to become law need not distract us from 
the focus of this article, which is whether the rule should become law. 
The answer to this question lies not in whether mothers or fathers 
benefit from the past caretaking standard, but whether children 
benefit. This topic we take up next, examining each of the main 
arguments offered in defense of the approximation rule: 
1) Will the rule reduce the incidence, scope, and complexity 
of trials? 195 
2) Will the rule minimize the motivation for manipulative 
and hostile bargaining?196 
3) Will the rule secure the custodial arrangements that 
parents would agree to if they were functioning rationally in 
accord with child-rearing choices they made in the past?197 
4) Most importantly, is the quantity of past caretaking a 
sufficient index of qualitative factors associated with 
children's best interests?198 
B. Impact of the Approximation Rule on Custody Trials 
ALI believes that the approximation rule will result in less 
frequent and less complicated litigation with less judicial discretion 
than under the best-interest standard. 199 ALI's charge that the best-
interest standard encourages custody trials (and the corollary 
expectation that the rule will reduce their incidence )200 is difficult to 
defend. No national data exist on the rate at which custody is decided 
by trial versus settlement. The best available evidence from which to 
extrapolate reveals a very high settlement/low litigation rate under 
the parenting time. ld. In this hypothetical, parenting time would be equally divided 
under the approximation rule. 
194. Emery, supra note 45, at 134. 
195. See infra pp. 124-37 and accompanying notes. 
196. See infra pp. 137-39 and accompanying notes. 
197. See infra pp. 139-42 and accompanying notes. 
198. See infra pp. 142-60 and accompanying notes. 
199. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b. 
200. See id. 
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the best-interest standard. A Stanford study of 1,124 families in 
California found that custody was either uncontested or decided after 
negotiations in 80% of the cases.201 Most of the remaining cases 
were settled through mandatory mediation (11%), or through 
negotiations following a custody evaluation or prior to the 
completion of a trial (7.5%).202 Only 1.5% of the cases proceeded to 
a complete tria1. 203 Two additional studies report greater than 90% 
rates of pretrial settlements.204 
The high rate of out-of-court settlements leaves little room for 
improvement and suggests that, contrary to the concerns of critics, 
the best-interest standard allows most couples to reach agreements 
rather than go to tria1.205 Even proponents of the approximation rule 
concede that ALI's assumption that the rule will reduce litigation (a 
key rationale offered for the proposal) is unrealistic. As Professor 
Mary E. O'Connell writes, "[C]hanging the law to decrease this 
already low litigation rate is of dubious value. ,,206 
Experience with other attempts to replace the best-interest 
standard with a clear-cut default rule have not delivered the hoped for 
reduction in litigation rates.207 A primary-caretaker preference in 
Minnesota produced "a frenzy of litigation" that two authors who 
support the preference attribute to an overly loose and flexible 
application?08 Similarly, Oregon's experience with a default joint 
custody presumption led to unanticipated consequences, such as 
201. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 82, at 137. 
202. ld. 
203. ld. 
204. BRAVER & O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 90-91 (reporting that 5% of a random 
sample of divorcing parents took their dispute to court); Logan et al., Divorce, 
Custody, and Spousal Violence, supra note 135, at 275 (reporting that 9% of a random 
sample of divorce cases with children were decided in a trial). 
205. It is possible that the low contest rate reflects, in part, the operation of an implicit 
maternal preference rule held by parents and their attorneys, particularly when young 
children and girls of any age are involved. See State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 
N'y.S.2d 285, 286-89 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (discussing past use of the maternal 
presumption and mothers' reliance upon it). 
206. O'Connell, supra note 45, at 130; see also Atwood, supra note 94, at 126 ("[T]he 
ALI's presumption is unlikely to reduce litigation for those few couples who cannot 
resolve matters on their own."). 
207. See, e.g., Gary L. Crippen & Sheila M. Stuhlman, Minnesota's Alternatives to 
Primary Caretaker Placements: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REv. 677,682 (2001). 
208. ld. at 681-85. 
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increases in the number of abuse actions and post-divorce custody 
motions.209 
It is possible that for some litigants the uncertainty of a trial's 
outcome is a deterrent rather than an inducement to proceed to trial. 
We should not assume, though, that a reduction in litigation rates 
necessarily represents "improvement." Although the ordeal of a 
custody trial undoubtedly takes a toll on the family, in some cases the 
alternative may be less desirable, such as an emotionally healthy 
parent capitulating to a seriously disturbed parent's demands in the 
interest of avoiding a tria1. 2IO 
There are two additional reasons why the approximation rule will 
not make a significant dent in the existing low litigation rate and is 
unlikely to simplify and expedite trials as envisioned by ALI. 1) 
Under the best-interest standard, disputes over past caretaking are 
common among custody litigants, and the Principles provides 
additional fuel for such disputes.211 Furthermore, adjudicating such 
disputes is more complicated than ALI acknowledges. 2) The 
exceptions and circumstances that modify the approximation rule 
provide plenty of focus for litigation with a high level of judicial 
discretion.212 
1. Disputes over Past Caretaking 
Under the best-interest standard, parents who proceed to trial 
usually do not agree on the proportion of their relative contributions 
to past caretaking.213 In the Approximation Rule Survey, 88% of 
attorneys and child custody evaluators confirmed that, if the 
approximation rule were operative, the litigants in their last custody 
trial would have disputed the past division of caretaking functions 
and still proceeded to trial.214 The approximation rule could fuel a 
higher rate of such disputes because it grants significant status and 
209. See Douglas W. Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Bargaining in the Shadow of Joint 
Parenting 10-12 (Oct. 2005) (Univ. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-25), 
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=820104. 
210. See, e.g., Logan, et aI., Divorce, Custody, and Spousal Violence, supra note 135, at 
276 ("Settling out of court can provide an opportunity for a husband to coerce the 
wife into accepting a lower financial payment in exchange for custody of the 
children."). 
211. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b. 
212. See Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra note 192, at 121. 
213. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b. 
214. Warshak, supra note 12, at 25. It is possible that some respondents took the survey 
with preconceived attitudes about the approximation rule and skewed their answers to 
support these attitudes. 
2011] Parenting by the Clock 127 
prerogatives to the parent whom the court decides has spent the most 
time performing past caretaking functions. 215 
Although the Principles explicitly discourages an adversarial 
divorce paradigm, it repeatedly describes the approximation rule as 
requiring the court to "allocate primary custodial responsibility.,,216 
The awarding of "primary" custodial responsibility to one parent 
implicitly demotes the other parent to "secondary" status.217 Rank 
ordering parents is likely to fuel discord, particularly at a time when 
parents are struggling to preserve their identities as parents in the face 
of the loss of their identities as spouses.218 Professor Schepard 
regards this process as "reminiscent of the search for a single 
psychological parent.,,219 Awarding primary custody is possible 
under the best-interest standard, but other options also are possible 
under this standard such as designating a parenting plan without 
labeling either parent as primary. 
Litigation over how much time each parent actually invested in 
caring for the children, whose account of the childcare status quo is 
most accurate, and, thus, who deserves recognition as the primary 
custodial parent is especially likely if either parent anticipates a 
future dispute over relocating with the child. In such cases, the 
primary parent is in the driver's seat when it comes to the freedom 10 
move a considerable distance away from the other parent with the 
child.220 The Principles' position on relocation is that "[t]he court 
should allow a parent who has been exercising the clear majority of 
215. See Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra note 192, at 121-23. 
216. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b, illus. I ("The past caretaking 
standard requires the court to allocate primary custodial responsibility to Sandra. "); 
see also id. § 2.08 cm!. c, illus. 5 ("That parent ordinarily will be allocated primary 
custodial responsibility for the child."); id. § 2.08 cmt. c, illus. 5 ("[T]he court should 
allocate primary custodial responsibility to Marie."). In this illustration, Marie's 
husband assumed the majority of childcare responsibilities for the entire year prior to 
the separation, but not for the years prior to that. Id. 
217. Warshak, supra note 16, at 604. 
218. Id. 
219. SCHEPARD, supra note 61, at 169. The notion that children have only one 
psychological parent has been discredited by a large body of evidence that 
demonstrates that infants normally develop close attachments to both of their parents 
and that they do best when they have the opportunity to establish and maintain such 
attachments. See, e.g., BILLER, supra note 74, at 11-12; Michael E. Lamb & Charlie 
Lewis, The Development and Significance of the Father-Child Relationships in Two-
Parent Families, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 280-81; 
PARKE, supra note 74, at 47-48; WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION, supra note 
30, at 35-36; Brieffor Lamusga Children, supra note 76, at 5-6. 
220. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.17(4)(a). 
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custodial responsibility to relocate with the child if that parent shows 
that the relocation is for a valid purpose, in good faith, and to a 
location that is reasonable in light of the purpose.,,221 With such a 
premium placed on having the primary or majority of custodial 
responsibility, and this designation riding on the single factor of how 
much time each parent invested in caring for the children, one can 
expect that this single factor will become a focus of dispute. 
The Principles recognizes that disputes about past caretaking may 
introduce difficulties in applying the approximation rule but expects 
that disputes over the relative amounts of the parents' past child-care 
are easier to resolve objectively than are those over the parents' 
relative ability to meet their children's needs and the quality of their 
child-care. 222 If this expectation were grounded in the practical 
realities of parenting, the outcome of litigation might be more 
predictable and the rule might accomplish its mission of reducing the 
incidence of trials and simplifying the court's task when trials do 
occur. However, tracking parental time devoted to children's care is 
discouragingly complicated.223 The difficulties in implementing the 
approximation rule become evident in the following example. 
A family in which the wife is a full-time homemaker and the 
husband is employed outside the home might seem the easiest in 
which to designate a primary caregiver. Allowing for variations, in 
such families the husband typically leaves for work about an hour 
before the child leaves for school. He returns home about two hours 
after the child returns home. Assuming that there is no structured 
after-school activity and that the child is not under the care of any 
other adults during this time, such as dance instructors, music 
teachers, and sports coaches (an unlikely assumption in many, if not 
most, families of school-age children), in each school week the 
mother has fifteen hours more than the father during which the child 
is under her care (three hours a day * five days a week). Research 
has established that less than two-thirds of this time involves direct 
personal interaction between mother and child.224 In fact, on a typical 
weekday, children in intact families spend only an average of two 
221. Id. 
222. Id. § 2.08, cmt. a-b. 
223. Warshak, supra note 16, at 609. 
224. Id.; see, e.g., Steven L. Nock & Paul W. Kingston, Time with Children: The Impact of 
Couples' Work-Time Commitments, 67 Soc. FORCES 59 (1988); W. Jean Yeung & 
Frank Stafford, Intra-Family Child Care Time Allocation: Stalled Revolution or Road 
to Equality? 22, 26, 61-62 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
author). 
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hours and fifteen minutes directly interacting with either parent. 225 
Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, assume that the mother has 
this fifteen-hour advantage during the school week. 
The example becomes complicated, and the division of childcare 
difficult to estimate, when it includes real-life permutations. If the 
father coaches his child's soccer team, or attends the practices with 
the child, this gives the father about two more hours of caretaking 
each night of practice, assuming that some time is spent preparing to 
leave the house and driving to and from the soccer field. However, if 
the mother takes the child to soccer practice, this gives her two more 
hours, unless she drops the child off at the field and has no contact 
with the child until she picks her up at the end of practice. Add to the 
equation inconvenient facts such as work holidays about one day per 
month, overnight Scout camp-outs, and part-time jobs, and it is 
apparent that the task of estimating caretaking time is not clear-cut. 
Making matters even more complicated, parents often spend different 
amounts of time with each child in the family. Multiply the difficulty 
when the relevant time investments are in the past. 
Sociologists who use sophisticated methods to track parental time 
devoted to children find the task complex and daunting. 226 The 
scientists dispute methods and findings, arguing issues such as to 
what degree does a parent's being available to, as opposed to engaged 
with, offspring qualify as caretaking?227 As Professor Michael E. 
Lamb explains, "Involvement is a multifaceted concept that 
comprises interaction, supervision, availability, and various types of 
cognitive and emotional engagement .... ,,228 If the experts have 
trouble agreeing on contemporaneous measures of parental childcare 
225. Frank Stafford & W. Jean Yeung, Parental Childcare Time and Children's Cognitive 
Development, ATUSUSERS.UMD.EDU (Oct. 19, 2007) http://www.atususers.umd.edu 
Iwip2/papers _i2007 IStafford _ Children. pdf. 
226. Michelle Budig & Nancy Folbre, Activity, Proximity, or Responsibility? Measuring 
Parental Childcare Time, in FAMILY TIME: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CARE 51 
(Nancy Folbre & Michael Bittman eds., 2004); Frank Stafford & W. Jean Yeung, The 
Distribution of Children's Developmental Resources, in ECONOMICS OF TIME USE 289 
(Daniel Hamermesh & G.A. Pfann ed., 2005); see also Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, 
at 218-20. 
227. Budig & Folbre, supra note 226; Stafford & Yeung, supra note 226; see also 
Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 218-20 (describing complications in measuring 
father-child contact, and concluding, "[n]ew measures of amount of parenting time 
are needed that have good psychometric properties and that are sensitive to different 
parenting time schedules"). 
228. Michael E. Lamb, The "Approximation Rule"; Another Proposed Reform that Misses 
the Target, 1 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 135-36 (2007). 
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time, surely parents in a custody battle, with so much riding on the 
numbers, will dispute each other's estimates of past time invested in 
caretaking. Unless parents have been punching time clocks every 
time they interact with their children, and saving the time cards, this 
will be one more arena for "he said/she said" arguments. 
The example above highlights only the problems in measuring 
what is observable about what each parent does with the child. Apart 
from the extreme of severely harsh, abusive, and irrational parenting, 
much of what goes on between parents and children is subtle and 
indirect, neither immediately apparent nor easy to quantify. 229 Hired 
help can perform the same chores as a parent, yet the parent's efforts 
carry additional impact. 230 Parents who mow the lawn or clean the 
house demonstrate to their children pride in the horne, responsibility, 
discipline, delay of gratification, and maturity in completing work 
before play.231 These values cannot be measured by the time it takes 
to perform the chores.232 
Two of the caretaking functions that the Principles lists are 
"helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate interpersonal 
relationships" and "providing moral and ethical guidance.,,233 The 
time each parent spent instilling social skills and moral values cannot 
be reduced to the time each parent spent lecturing the child in these 
areas (assuming that such time could be measured, which of course is 
impossible).234 
An axiom of child rearing is that children learn their lessons more 
from what their parents do than what their parents say.235 When 
parents work forty hours a week outside the horne, they demonstrate 
important moral virtues, as do parents who mow the lawn or do the 
laundry. 236 
Empathy is the bedrock of successful high quality relationships, 
for children and for adults. It is what partners in successful 
relationships and effective therapists have in abundance and what 
229. See Stephen A. Small & Gay Eastman, Rearing Adolescents in Contemporary Society: 
A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Responsibilities and Needs of 
Parents, 40 FAM. REL. 455, 455-57 (1991) (discussing the many different functions of 
effective parenting). 
230. See id. at 455. 
23l. See Mary Holland Benin & Debra A. Edwards, Adolescents' Chores: The Difference 
between Dual- and Single-Earner Families, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 361, 361-65 
(1990); Small & Eastman, supra note 229, at 457. 
232. See Budig & Folbre, supra note 226, at 51, 63. 
233. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at § 2.03 (5). 
234. Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra note 192, at 122. 
235. See Small & Eastman, supra note 229, at 457. 
236. See id. 
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serial killers lack.237 A Yale University twenty-six-year study found 
that the one factor most predictive of empathy in adults is growing up 
with a father in the home.238 The study was conducted in an era when 
the distribution of time the average child spent with her mother 
versus her father was even more skewed than it is today.239 How does 
one measure the amount of time that the father contributed to the 
development in his children of this most critical personality trait? 
A group of boys I call "the baseball bat kids" provide the last 
example illustrating that the approximation rule is not only difficult 
to implement, it is impossible. 
I have treated several boys who slept with baseball bats under their 
bed. This was not the reason they consulted me. But in the course of 
our work together, either the mother mentioned it, or the boy 
confided in me a concern about his behavior. 
The baseball bat kids all lived with their mothers after their 
parents' divorce, and were not seeing their fathers as much as they 
wanted. In every case it wasn't until after Dad moved out of the 
home that the baseball bat migrated to the place where monsters hide 
when boys are little, and girly magazines hide when they're not so 
little. 
We can speculate that keeping the baseball bat close was 
compensation for the absence of the parent most closely identified 
with the sport. Or that the bat provided a sense of comfort through its 
association with a relaxed and rewarding portion of the boy's life, 
where the biggest worry was losing the game, not losing a parent. Or 
that the bat represented a world far removed from domestic turmoil, 
where conflict is encapsulated and expressed in a harmless and 
entertaining manner, according to rules that are predictable and 
consistently applied. 
Speculations aside, according to the boys, their conscious 
intention in parking the baseball bat under the bed was to keep it 
handy for self-defense. Quite simply, when Dad left the home he 
237. See John M. Gottman & Alan L. Porterfield, Communicative Competence in the 
Nonverbal Behavior of Married Couples, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 817,822 (1981); 
Alan L. Sillars & Michael D. Scott, Interpersonal Perception Between Intimates: An 
Integrative Review, 10 HUM. COMM. REs. 153, 167 (1983); ROBERT D. HARE, 
WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG Us 
(1999) (1993); Leslie S. Greenberg et ai., Empathy, 38 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, 
REs., PRAC., TRAINING 380,382 (2001). 
238. Richard Koestner, et ai., The Family Origins of Empathic Concern: A 26-Year 
Longitudinal Study, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 709, 713 (1990). 
239. Warshak, supra note 16, at 610. 
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took with him his children's sense of physical protection and 
safety. 240 
Herein lies a central problem with the approximation rule. How 
do we measure the amount of time that a father devotes to providing 
his children with an atmosphere in which they feel physically 
protected? It cannot be done. 
Given the extent to which litigating couples currently dispute each 
other's account of past caretaking, and adding the Principles' 
incentives for disputes over past caretaking and the difficulties in 
objectively measuring this factor, it is reasonable to assume that the 
approximation rule will fail to provide the more certain outcome that 
significantly reduces the incidence of trials. Although focusing on 
one factor may simplify the court's task, the task is far from 
simple.241 
2. The Exceptions Swallow the Rule 
Even without the difficulties in determining relative contributions 
to past caretaking, the exceptions to the approximation rule make it 
unlikely that the rule will reduce the incidence, scope, and 
complexity of trials, the extent of judicial discretion, or the 
240. Id. at 611. 
241. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 126, at 53. Laufer-Ukeles argues that the approximation 
rule is similar to a best interests inquiry in that 
it is intensely factual and subject to dispute. . .. Nailing down 
who has done what for what percentage of time over the course of 
the marriage could be a difficult exercise, particularly in hostile 
situations where custody determinations are highly contested .... 
This inquiry could potentially bring the same indeterminacy and 
fear of litigation that exists under the best interest standard. 
Id. For a similar point regarding the primary caretaker presumption, see Levy, supra 
note 11, at 71 ("Determining which parent was in fact 'primary' can cause as many 
proof problems as the 'best interests' test."); Hoover v. Hoover, 764 A.2d 1192, 1194 
(Vt. 2000) (underscoring the difficulty of adjudicating the amount of time spent in 
caregiving). The appellate court in Hoover affirmed that the trial court record 
supported the court's finding of fact that the father had "a slightly more active 
engagement in the child's lives." Hoover, 764 A.2d at 1194. The "[t]ather testified 
that he had dinner with the children every week night but Tuesdays and would then 
help them with their homework before they returned to their mother's house for bed." 
Id. at 1195. The dissent argued that "[t]irst and foremost, the court erred in its 
findings related to how much time the children spent with each parent." Id. at 1197 
(Johnson, J. dissenting). The dissent added that the trial court's finding "use[d] the 
wrong measure of waking hours by looking only at the after-school hours rather than 
at all the children's waking hours." Id. at 1198. As opposed to the trial court's ruling 
and the appellate court's affirmation, the dissent calculated that the mother spent more 
than twice as many hours in past caregiving than the father did. Id. at 1198. 
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involvement of child custody evaluators. 242 The exceptions and 
circumstances that modify the approximation rule (such as gross 
disparity in parental abilities or availability, the preferences of a 
child, domestic violence, child abuse, or interference with access to a 
child) are the very issues central to most of the relatively few cases 
that go to trial. 243 Professor Parkinson notes that the Principles' 
exceptions are the rule in litigated cases.244 It is likely that in cases 
that go to trial, attorneys will mine exceptions to the approximation 
rule and trigger traditional best-interest inquiries no different from 
current practices.245 
The results of the Approximation Rule Survey support these 
observations. Ninety-five percent of respondents reported that under 
the approximation rule one or both of the litigants in their last 
custody trial would have raised one or more of the exceptions to the 
rule. 246 In the smaller subsample of child custody evaluators, 100% 
reported that the approximation rule's exceptions were raised in the 
last case they were involved in that went to trial and that enactment 
of the approximation rule would not have caused the case to settle.247 
Litigants who believe that the past caretaking standard will work 
against them are most likely to invoke one of the exceptions.248 For 
instance, the child's preference, if judged to be reasonable, is one 
exception that trumps the application of the rule. 249 Could this 
exception lead some parents to pressure their children to express 
preferences for one parent and against the other? Such destructive 
manipulation of children's affections occurs under the prevailing 
best-interest standard.250 But it may be even more likely under the 
approximation rule because the Principles notably fails to include in 
its list of exceptions gross disparities in each parent's support of the 
child's relationship with the other, a factor common to many best-
242. See Warshak, supra note 16, at 604. 
243. See id. 
244. Parkinson, supra note 121, at 451. 
245. See Smith, supra note 46, at 742 ("When discretion allows an exception to 'swallow 
the rule,' then the rule is doomed to failure."). 
246. Warshak, supra note 12, at 25. 
247. See id. 
248. Parkinson, supra note 121, at 450-51. 
249. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1)(b). 
250. See id. § 2.02 cmt. c. 
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interest inquiries2s1 that might discourage attempts to undermine the 
child's relationship with the other parent.252 
251. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a), (I), (r) (2009). 
252. It might be argued that a parent who attempts to tum children against the other parent 
would trigger one of the existing exceptions to the rule, such as a gross disparity in 
each parent's demonstrated ability to meet the child's needs, see PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 3, § 2.08(1)(d), or, in extreme cases, it might constitute persistent interference 
with a parent's access to the child. See id. § 2.1 1 (l)(d). Nevertheless, had the 
PRINCIPLES included an explicit "unfriendly parent" exception, this might serve as a 
disincentive to manipulate the children's affections. But see Dore, supra note 125, at 
42, who views the "friendly parent" concept with alarm and argues that it encourages 
conflict and prevents parents from protecting themselves and their children from 
abuse, violence, and neglect because of the fear of losing custody if labeled a non-
friendly parent. This concern may have contributed to the conspicuous absence of an 
unfriendly parent exception to the approximation rule. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, 
at 2.08 cmt. j, Reporter's Note ("Friendly parent provisions have been criticized on 
the grounds that they disfavor a parent who may have good reasons for not wanting 
the children to have significant contact with the other parent."); Linda D. Elrod & 
Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The 
Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 394 (2008) ("On one side 
[friendly parent provisions] simultaneously protect against unwarranted withholding 
of parenting time and frivolous allegations of abuse or unfit parenting, while on the 
other side they may hinder reasonable inquiry into inappropriate or questionable 
parenting practices if such inquiries are labeled 'unfriendly. "'). Rather than eliminate 
a factor that clearly is associated with good parenting in the majority of families, 
statutory and case law can qualify that a parent's support of the child's relationship 
and contact with the other parent is not a factor to be considered in evaluating the best 
interest of a child when a parent has good reasons to be concerned that such contact 
would endanger the health or safety of either the parent or the child and is acting in 
good faith to protect the child. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090(6)(E) (2008). 
Also, good faith opposition to joint legal or physical custody should not per se earn a 
litigant the designation of "unfriendly parent." Just as some legal and mental health 
professionals raise concerns about whether it is reasonable to expect divorced parents 
to cooperate on joint decision-making, and about the potential destabilizing impact of 
a child having two home bases rather than one, a parent can have the same concerns. 
See supra notes 92-93. Even if these opinions ignore social science evidence, 
children's preferences, or public policy in favor of joint custody, even if the opinions 
reflect unwarranted bias against joint custody, such a bias addresses itself to the 
structure of decision-making and the parenting time plan, and does not in and of itself 
mean that the parent fails to support the child's healthy relationship with the other 
parent. 
One question that the court may consider is whether the parent is apt to comply with 
court orders if these include joint custody provisions. The court may examine the 
parent's behavior under temporary orders to assess whether the parent's opposition to 
joint custody is reflected in behavior that fails to support, or undermines, the child's 
relationship with the other parent, and whether the parent's behavior violates 
temporary orders for joint decision-making or for the child's access to the other 
parent. Even here, it is important to distinguish between a parent's initial and short-
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In addition to defeating the goals of reducing the incidence and 
scope of litigation, the exceptions to the approximation rule open a 
wide door for judicial discretion. Labeling the exceptions "escape 
hatches," Professor Levy notes, "The exceptions to the rigid 
'approximate the time spent' doctrine seem to give judges as much 
discretion as the 'best interests' test does.,,253 Indeed, the three cases 
where the West Virginia appellate courts referenced the 
approximation rule statute all involved exceptions to the 
approximation rule and triggered a best-interest analysis. 254 
The exceptions also undermine the Principles' goal to diminish 
the court's reliance on expert testimony.255 The value, limitations, 
scope, and reliability of expert testimony are hotly contested in the 
literature and are vital issues to explore.256 But it is unclear how the 
term responses fueled by emotions surrounding the marital separation and responses 
that are likely to be more lasting. 
253. Levy, supra note 11, at 76-77 (,"Consider the provision which requires the judge to 
vary the custody award to 'protect the child's welfare when the presumptive allocation 
... would harm the child because of a gross disparity in the quality of the emotional 
attachment between each parent and the child or in each parent's demonstrated ability 
or availability to meet the child's needs.' What good trial judge would not be able to 
reach any outcome consistent with the judge's view of the facts and beliefs as to the 
child's 'best interests?''') (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(d)). 
254. In re Adoption of Jon L., 625 S.E.2d 251,253-55,260 (W. Va. 2005); Lindsie D.L. v. 
Richard W.S., 591 S.E.2d 308,313-14 (W. Va. 2003); Marriage ofB.M.J. v. 1.D.J., 
575 S.E.2d 272, 276-77 (W. Va. 2002). Professor Sanders's analysis reveals that 
West Virginia courts have virtually ignored the approximation rule legislation: 
Instead of citing the current legislation, the courts have cited 
Carter v. Carter, which held that '[i]n visitation as well as 
custody matters, we have traditionally held paramount the best 
interest of the child.' Decided in 1996, this case was before the 
approximation standard was adopted. The Carter case has been 
cited twenty-eight times for the use of the best interest of the child 
standard since the legislature passed the approximation standard. 
Sanders, supra note 135, at 25 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing 
Carter v. Carter, 470 S.E.2d 193 (W. Va. 1996); Misty D.G. v. Rodney L.F., 650 
S.E.2d 243, 245 (W. Va. 2007); Mary R. v. Billy D., 637 S.E.2d 618, 622 (W. Va. 
2006)). Sanders argues that the PRlNCIPLES' authors use language in the exceptions, 
such as "gross disparity" and "manifestly harmful" to signal their intention that the 
exceptions will be applied rarely and only in the most exceptional cases. Id. at 22. In 
view of West Virginia's experience, Sanders advocates creating more precise 
guidelines for judges to allocate past caretaking, id. at 26, and refining the 
approximation rule to reduce judicial discretion in its application. Id. at 26-27. 
255. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b; Sanders, supra note 135, at 19-20. 
256. See, e.g., Tippins & Wittman, supra note 99, at 193, 198,204. The same journal issue 
contains eight commentaries on Tippins & Wittman and the authors' rejoinder to the 
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approximation rule, with its exceptions, necessitates any difference in 
the court's propensity to appoint experts.257 Although the Principles 
favors custody adjudication without expert testimony, which it sees 
as a costly and undesirable byproduct of the best-interest standard/58 
commentaries. Id. at 218. For more on expert testimony, see Emery et aI., supra note 
52, at 7; RICHARD A. WARSHAK, CUSTODY CONSULTATION WITH DIVORCING FAMILIES: 
How TO AVOID THERAPEUTIC PITFALLS (BMA Audio Cassettes 1983); Daniel W. 
Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say About "The 
Best Interests of the Child"?: An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of 
Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551, 551,553, 566--67 (1997); WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY 
REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 214-17; WARSHAK, supra note 90, at 298-301. See 
generally Logan et aI., supra note 135 (reporting the results of a random sample of 
custody evaluations in Kentucky, forty-six of which were classified as cases with 
domestic violence, and concluding that custody evaluators did a poor job of 
investigating and considering domestic violence issues in their procedures and 
recommendations). 
257. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.13(1); see also id. § 2.13 cmts. a-c. 
258. 1d. § 2.02 cmt. c. Although expert child custody evaluations add to litigant's 
expenses, if the evaluation assists in settling the case without a trial, it is possible that 
such evaluations result in a net reduction of expenses. See W ARSHAK, THE CUSTODY 
REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 215. The PRINCIPLES offers no evidence to support its 
skewed claim that expert testimony tends to focus on parental weaknesses. See 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 cmt. c. To the contrary, guidelines for custody 
evaluators issued by professional organizations suggest the importance of a balanced 
assessment of psychological factors relevant to the best interest of the child. See, e.g., 
American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in 
Divorce Proceedings, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 677, 678 (1994) ("The values of the 
parents relevant to parenting, ability to plan for the child's future needs, capacity to 
provide a stable and loving home, and any potential for inappropriate behavior or 
misconduct that might negatively influence the child also are considered. 
Psychopathology may be relevant to such an assessment, insofar as it has impact on 
the child or the ability to parent, but it is not the primary focus."); see also American 
Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Family Law 
Proceedings, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 864 (2010) ("Psychologists strive to identify 
the psychological best interests of the child. To this end, they are encouraged to 
weigh and incorporate such overlapping factors as family dynamics and interactions; 
cultural and environmental variables; relevant challenges and aptitudes for all 
examined parties; and the child's educational, physical, and psychological needs .... 
The most useful and influential evaluations focus upon skills, deficits, values, and 
tendencies relevant to parenting attributes and a child's psychological needs."); see 
also Task Force for Model Standards of Practice for Child Custody Evaluation, Model 
Standards of Practice for Child Custody Evaluation, 45 FAM. CT. REv. 70-80 
(2007). Similarly, learned treatises on custody evaluations describe procedures for, 
and stress the importance of, assessing parental strengths. See RICHARD A. GARDNER, 
FAMILY EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND LITIGATION 
127 (1989); JONATHAN W. GOULD & DAVID A. MARTINDALE, THE ART AND SCIENCE 
OF CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 185-87 (2007); PHILIP MICHAEL STAHL, 
CONDUCTING CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 80-81 (1994). 
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it simultaneously recognizes the potential value of expert 
involvement and explicitly grants courts the option of appointing 
experts to assist the court. 259 The exceptions to the approximation 
rule give courts as much reason to exercise this option as they have 
under the best-interest standard.260 For instance, when a parent 
proffers a child's firm preference as an exception to the rule, the 
Principles directs the court to determine if the preference is 
"reasonable.,,261 To assist in its determination, the court may appoint 
an expert to examine the reasons for the child's preference and the 
maturity and independence of the child's judgment. 262 
C. Impact of the Approximation Rule on the Bargaining Process 
Critics of a discretionary standard argue that uncertainty about the 
likely outcome of a trial leads to more abusive and hostile 
bargaining.263 Twenty-eight years ago Professor Schneider noted the 
lack of empirical foundation for this assumption, and this lack has not 
yet been rectified.264 Thus, arguments about how legal presumptions 
influence divorce negotiations must remain at the level of 
speculation. Professor Schneider also observed the link between 
judicial discretion and the range of freedom in negotiation: "The less 
certain the litigants are what result a court would reach, the greater 
the practical scope for bargaining: the clearer it is that a court would 
reach a particular result, the less incentive the party who would 
benefit from that result has to make concessions.,,265 We simply do 
not know if presumptions would enhance the fairness of negotiations. 
ALI anticipates that the approximation rule will reduce strategic 
and manipulative bargaining because the rule is seen as establishing a 
clear determinate criterion that will minimize the opportunity to use 
Also, the court can rely upon attorneys to elicit testimony from expert witnesses about 
their client's strengths. GARDNER, supra, at 131. 
259. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.13 (I) ("The court may order a written investigation or 
evaluation to assist it in determining any issue relevant to proceedings under this 
Chapter. The court should specify the scope of the investigation or evaluation and the 
authority of the investigator or evaluator."). 
260. Id. § 2.13(1); see also id. § 2.13 cmts. a-c. 
261. Id. § 2.08(1)(b). 
262. See Richard A. Warshak, Payoffs and Pitfalls of Listening to Children, 52 F AM. REL. 
373 (2003). 
263. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2276 (quoting Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and 
Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TuL. L. REv. 1165, 
1170 (1986». 
264. Id. at 2276-79. 
265. Id. at 2278. 
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positions on custody as leverage in bargaining financial aspects of the 
divorce.266 In addition to a potentially fairer outcome, this would 
benefit children because pre-litigation maneuvers often exacerbate 
parental conflict, which in tum can affect children adversely.267 As 
shown above, though, the difficulties in measuring past caretaking 
and the exceptions to the rule combine to make the rule less 
determinate than ALI intends.268 
Only 25% of respondents to the Approximation Rule Survey 
believe that the approximation rule would have reduced strategic and 
manipulative behaviors during negotiation in their last case that 
proceeded to trial. 269 These results suggest that a minority of 
practitioners believe the rule would have the effect on negotiations 
anticipated by ALL We need to know more about those cases that 
might experience this benefit. It may be that in certain types of cases, 
other legal presumptions that purport to reduce judicial discretion 
would have a beneficial impact on the tone of negotiations. The 
Approximation Rule Survey supports this hypothesis. Slightly more 
respondents (28%) thought that manipulative bargaining would be 
reduced with a presumption in favor of a school-year schedule 
dividing the child's time between homes nine days/five days during 
every two-week period.270 This reflects what is known in Texas as 
the extended Standard Possession Order.271 Attorneys who practice 
in Texas and thus have experience with this presumption were even 
more likely to credit it with reducing manipulations (37%) during 
negotiations.272 A presumption in favor of an equal division of time 
between homes was endorsed by 32% of respondents as likely to 
266. Concern about trading time for financial concessions is expressed frequently. Garska 
v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,360--62 (W. Va. 1981) ("[U]ncertainty about the outcome 
of custody disputes leads to the irresistible temptation to trade the custody of the child 
in return for lower alimony and child support payments .... [Uncertainty is also] very 
destructive of the primary-caretaker parent because he or she will be willing to 
sacrifice everything else in order to avoid the terrible prospect of losing the child in 
the unpredictable process of litigation."); see also Richard Neely, The Primary 
Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & 
POL'y REv. 168,177 (\984); Chambers, supra note 93, at 499; Fineman, supra note 
46, at 761; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 57, at 971-73. But see Fabricius et at, 
supra note 34, at 211 (arguing that empirical research fails to support this concern). 
267. See Cassandra Brown, Comment, Ameliorating the Effects of Divorce on Children, 22 
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 461, 462--64 (2009). 
268. See supra Part IV.B.1-2. 
269. Warshak, supra note 12, at 26. 
270. Id. 
271. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.311 (West 2011). 
272. See Warshak, supra note 12. 
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reduce manipulative bargaining. 273 Thus, although a minority of 
respondents agree with ALI that the approximation rule would 
improve the bargaining atmosphere, comparable numbers of 
respondents attribute such a benefit to other custody presumptions, 
and the majority of respondents believe that manipulative bargaining 
tactics in cases that proceed to trial would be unaffected by any legal 
presumptions. 274 
One recent development in family law poses a special challenge to 
critics who regard the best-interest standard as creating an 
environment that encourages hostile, adversarial, negotiations and 
litigation: the birth and spread of collaborative divorce. 275 Even if 
collaborative divorce appeals to parents only because they fear the 
uncertainty of a trial based on the best-interest standard, and not for 
more benevolent reasons, the fact remains that an entire movement 
opposing adversarial negotiations and litigation arose in the shadow 
of the best-interest standard.276 This directly contradicts the argument 
that the best-interest standard necessarily results in hostile negotiating 
environments and higher litigation rates.277 
In addition to collaborative divorce, other law reforms, some 
endorsed by the Principles, have been adopted within the context of 
the best-interest standard and have helped to reduce the adversarial 
process of custody decision-making.278 These are discussed in a 
subsequent section on contemporary applications of the best-interest 
standard.279 
D. Implications of Parents' Past Decisions 
The Principles assumes that "when parents do not agree, past 
divisions of responsibility may be the most reliable proxy for the 
shares of responsibility they would agree upon if they were focused 
on their child.,,280 As the Principles explains: 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN 
DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 5, 179 (2001). 
276. See id. at 179. 
277. See Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It is the "Right" Thing to 
Do, 27 PACE L. REv. 869,900 (2007). 
278. See Warshak, supra note 16, at 612-13. 
279. See irifra Part X; see also Warshak, supra note 16, at 611-13. 
280. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ch. 1, topic 1, p!. II, em!. c. 
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[E]xpectations and preferences are often complicated at 
divorce by feelings of loss, anxiety, guilt, and anger-
feelings that tend not only to cloud a parent's judgment and 
ability to make decisions on behalf of the child, but also to 
exaggerate the amount of responsibility a parent wants to 
assume for a child, or the objections he or she has to the 
other parent's level of involvement in the child's life. The 
way the parents chose to divide responsibility when the 
family lived together anchors the negotiations in their own 
lived experience rather than in unrealistic or emotion-based 
aspirations about the future. 281 
The divorce research literature supports the Principles' 
observation that parents' decisions during a divorce often unduly 
reflect strong, transient emotions rather than a rational appreciation of 
their children's needs and of the likely consequences of various 
alternative plans.282 Bypassing the risk of irrational and uninformed 
decisions is an important goal. Relying on the parents' division of 
responsibilities during the marriage, though, is not necessarily the 
best detour around these hazards. In some instances, the past division 
of responsibilities does offer valuable guidance when formulating 
optimal parenting plans; but in other instances, the past is a poor 
index of what disputing parents would agree to if they were 
functioning rationally and with a realistic view of the future. 283 
Additional considerations, such as anticipated changes in parents' 
availability to the children, are relevant to such decisions.284 
In addition, the Principles seems to regard past decisions in a 
narrow and simplistic manner and fails to consider the context of past 
parental decisions.285 Consider the case of a woman who decides to 
keep her job outside the home while her husband remains at home 
with their infant for the first year of life. They discussed the 
possibility of switching roles in the future, but had no understanding 
of any specific time frame. After one year, the husband and wife 
divorce. Should this mother now be locked into a schedule that gives 
her relatively little time with her daughter for the next seventeen 
years?286 When a couple decides on a homemaker-breadwinner 
281. Id. § 2.08 cmt. b. 
282. Warshak, supra note 16, at 605. 
283. Id. at 605-06; see PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, §§ 2.02 cmt. d, 2.08 cmt. b. 
284. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. h. 
285. Warshak, supra note 16, at 605; see PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. d. 
286. ALl might object that PRINCIPLES § 2.08 (1) (e)'s exception for prior agreements 
covers this contingency. The exception is made in order 
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division of roles, they are not necessarily making a long-term 
agreement that one parent will give up outside career opportunities 
and the other will spend less time with the children despite any 
changes in their circumstances, including the loss of daily contact 
with the children which accompanies divorce. Decisions made 
during the marriage are choices about how responsibilities will be 
divided in the present and given the current context, not how 
responsibilities will be divided in the future and in contexts far 
different from those of a harmonious marriage. Primary wage 
earners in the family would most likely argue that the rule does not 
apply to their situation because of the exception to the rule regarding 
reasonable expectations.287 They did not expect that their role as 
wage earner would marginalize their postdivorce parental 
prerogatives.288 
Further, one parent might spend less time with the children than 
the other, not because the children are better off in the other parent's 
care, but because the other parent acts as a gatekeeper, regulating the 
scope and amount of contact that his or her spouse has with the 
children.289 Also, in unhappy marriages, one spouse commonly 
escapes the tension of an unhappy marriage by spending more time 
away from the home.29o This reduces difficult interactions between 
the parents and, consequently, the overt conflict to which the children 
might be exposed.291 Given such conditions, the choice to spend 
more time with the children following the separation might be a 
to take into account any prior agreement, other than one under § 2.06, that 
would be appropriate to consider in light of the circumstances as a whole, 
including the reasonable expectations of the parties, the extent to which 
they could have reasonably anticipated the events that occurred and their 
significance, and the interests ofthe child. 
Id. Section 2.06 (1) (b) prohibits agreements that "would be harmful to the child." 
The father in this scenario would undoubtedly argue that no prior agreement existed, 
and even if it did, it would be harmful to interrupt the familiar pattern of caretaking. 
This scenario illustrates the manner in which the exceptions to the rule undermine the 
goal of increasing the predictability of the outcome of litigation. See also Warshak, 
supra note 16, at 605. 
287. Warshak, supra note 16, at 605; see PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1)(e). Id. 
288. Warshak, supra note 16, at 605. 
289. See Joan B. Kelly, Children's Adjustment in Conflicted Marriage and Divorce: A 
Decade Review of Research, 1. AM. ACAD. CHILD. & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 963, 
965 (2000). 
290. See, e.g., id. 
291. See id. at 963--66. 
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rational decision rather than one anchored in "emotion-based 
aspirations. ,,292 
Other sections of the ALI Principles recognize that decisions 
made in another context, prior to the contemplation of divorce, may 
be poor guides to fair post-divorce outcomes. With respect to 
premarital agreements, for instance, the Principles proposes: 
The law's usual assumption that contracting parties are 
capable judges of their own self-interest is put in doubt 
when the judgment is so distant in time and circumstance 
from its consequences. This capability problem is 
exacerbated by another uncommon feature of premarital 
agreements: its principal terms speak exclusively to a 
marital dissolution that the parties do not expect to occur, 
and so the agreement has no expected application. Finally, 
agreements are static, but relationships are not. The 
agreement may have contemplated a relationship very 
different than the one that the parties in fact later lived.293 
It seems inconsistent for the Principles to allow such reasoning to 
modify financial agreements, but not agreements about the division 
of childcare tasks. 294 Indeed, the Principles recommends that courts 
should limit the effects of past parental agreements for dividing 
custodial responsibility rather than defer to such prior agreements: 
"Prenuptial agreements are typically made in contexts, and with 
respect to matters, as to which individuals are unable to predict and 
assess realistically either the events that will happen in the future, or 
the significance of the interests they are bargaining away.,,295 
E. Is Past Parenting Quantity a Proxy for Past, Present, and Future 
Parenting Quality? 
Traditional wisdom holds that the past is the best predictor of the 
future. This may be true in the absence of knowledge about likely 
future outcomes and in the absence of any significant change that 
could alter established patterns. But when a substantial body of 
social science research allows reliable predictions, society 
292. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b. 
293. Jd. ch. 1, topic 1, subch. I. 
294. See id. § 2.08 cmt. i. 
295. Id. 
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shortchanges children if this knowledge is ignored in planning for 
their futures. 296 
1. Promoting Stability and Continuity of Parent-Child 
Relationships in the Face of Divorce-Related Changes in the 
Family 
Relying on the past for decisions about the present and the future 
reflects a static view of family relationships; the Principles makes no 
accommodation for the kinds of changes that are likely to occur in the 
family after divorce and the effects that these changes may have on 
parenting time.297 Being a single parent is a very different challenge 
from being one of two parents in the same home. For instance, after 
divorce the average mother has less time and energy for her children 
and more problems managing their behavior, particularly that of her 
sons?98 
Unless we regard custody as a reward for past deeds, the decisions 
about parenting plans should reflect judgments about what 
arrangements will best meet children's needs now and in the future.299 
Differences in past performance are relevant only if they predict 
differences in future parental competence and child adjustment. 300 
But they do not. 
The amount of contact in the past, prior to divorce, does not even 
predict the amount of contact in the future, after divorce. 301 Among 
the factors that account for this discontinuity are the following: 1) 
most mothers who spent proportionally more time with the children 
either reenter the workforce or work longer hours away from home, 
296. See, e.g., David H. Demo & Alan C. Cook, The Impact of Divorce on Children, 50 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 619 (1988); William F. Hodges et aI., The Cumulative Effect of 
Stress on Preschool Children of Divorced and Intact Families, 46 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 611 (1984); Kelly, supra note 289, at 963-73. 
297. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. a. 
298. See, e.g., Hetherington et aI., supra note 30, at 252. 
299. SCHEPARD, supra note 61, at 168 ("The approximation presumption may also be 
looked at as a return on investment in child-rearing, the legal system's reward for the 
parent who spent the most time and energy caring for the child during the 
marriage. . .. A custody award to a parent, however, should not be a form of indirect 
compensation for time expended on child rearing. This argument is inconsistent with 
the partnership theory of marriage, which generally prohibits the allocation of the 
marital estate accumulated by the spouses according to their roles in creating the 
wealth."); see also Richard A. Warshak, Gender Bias in Child Custody Decisions, 34 
F AM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 396,404 (1996). 
300. Warshak, supra note 16, at 606. 
301. Id. 
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2) as children grow older, they spend more time outside the orbit of 
their parents in school and with peers, and 3) the father can now 
interact with the children apart from the backdrop of a tense marital 
relationship, which, as discussed above, keeps some men in unhappy 
marriages spending more time than they would prefer away from the 
home and children. 302 
The approximation rule makes no allowance for normal changes in 
the proportion of mother's versus father's caretaking time. 303 In a 
family with a homemaker-breadwinner division of roles, the 
difference between the parents in proportion of parenting time is 
much greater before than after the children begin elementary school 
(unless they are home-schooled).304 For separations that occur when 
children are pre-schoolers, the rule freezes the allocation of custodial 
time at a level that maximizes the difference in the amount of time 
the children spend with each parent. 305 A reduction in this difference 
would occur only with the consent of the parent who is awarded the 
most time with the children.306 The Principles fails to recognize that 
even if the family were to remain intact, there would be a significant 
reduction in the difference when the children entered elementary 
school, and the relative amount of time each parent spends with each 
child would most likely change over the course ofthe child's life.307 
The Principles values the importance of both parents, calls for a 
minimum presumptive amount of parenting time, and asserts that the 
approximation rule "is calculated to preserve the greatest degree of 
stability in the child's life.,,308 Nevertheless, the Principles places a 
clear priority on maintaining the stability of the child's relationship 
with the parent who is designated the primary caretaker: "[T]he 
parents' separation may make it necessary for them to change their 
work schedules and rearrange other obligations. The inevitability of 
such changes, however, makes it all the more desirable that there be 
stability as to those matters the court can affect, especially the child's 
302. Jd. at 606-07; see E. Mavis Hetherington, Coping with Family Transitions: Winners, 
Losers and Survivors, 60 CHILD. DEV. 1 (1989). 




307. Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra note 192, at 122; see also Montenegro v. 
Diaz, 27 P.3d 289 (2001) (No. S090699) (recognizing that children's needs change 
over time and that custody arrangements should respond to such changes: "[T]he 
changed circumstance rule should be flexible and should reflect the changing needs of 
children as they grow up."). 
308. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08, cmt. b; Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra 
note 192, at 123. 
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relationships with the primary caretaker.,,309 This begs the question, 
if stability is desirable, why not develop a parenting plan that 
preserves the stability of the child's relationship with both parents? 
Such a dual-parent focus is consistent with the section of the 
Principles that defines children's best interests as including 
"continuity of existing parent-child attachments" and "meaningful 
contact between the child and each parent.,,310 
In contrast, the best-interest standard assigns no priority to either 
parent-child relationship.31l In some cases, a court-imposed 
residential schedule will resemble an approximation rule outcome.312 
In other cases, the schedule may increase the proportion of time with 
a parent to accommodate postdivorce changes and to offset the loss 
of daily contact.313 The best-interest standard employs this flexibility; 
the approximation rule does not.314 
The Principles' emphasis on preserving the child's relationship 
with the primary caretaker may be influenced by research with 
children in sole-custody arrangements.315 In general, this research 
reports a relatively high correlation between children's positive 
adjustments after divorce and the psychological adjustments and 
quality of parenting provided by the residential parents.316 In 
addition, some psychologists believe that children have a more salient 
attachment to one parent than to the other. 317 Such findings should be 
considered alongside research that documents the damage suffered by 
children who experience a dramatic loss in frequency of contact with 
their nonresidential fathers compared with the pre-separation daily 
contact to which they were accustomed.318 Also, studies begun in the 
1950s and 1960s, when the division of caregiving time between 
309. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b. 
310. ld. § 2.02 (1); Warshak, supra note 16, at 607. 





316. For a review of this literature, see Kelly & Emery, supra note 70, at 352, 354, 356, 
358. 
317. Zeynep Biringen et al., Commentary on "Blanket Restrictions: Overnight Contact 
Between Parents and Young Children" 40 FAM. CT. REv. 204,-205 (2002). But see 
Richard A. Warshak, Who Will be There When 1 Cry in the Night?: Revisiting 
Overnights-A Rejoinder to Biringen et al., 40 FAM. CT. REv. 208, 210-11 (2002) 
(highlighting significant flaws in the arguments made by Biringen et al.). 
318. For reviews ofthis literature see Kelly, supra note 79, at 35-36, 43-44; Joan B. Kelly, 
Developing Beneficial Parenting Plan Models for Children Following Separation and 
Divorce, 191. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 237,237-38,240,242-43 (2005). 
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mothers and fathers was more pronounced than in contemporary 
times, show that long-term physical health risks are associated with 
poor childhood relationships with fathers as well as with mothers. 3\9 
Whatever its inspiration, the Principles' emphasis on past caretaking 
time and on preserving the stability of the child's relationship with 
one parent risks undermining its own declared value of the child's 
relationship with both parents after the divorce, a value that has 
widespread consensus among developmental researchers.32o 
The importance of preserving high-quality relationships with both 
parents is highlighted by research that documents the deterioration of 
postdivorce father-child relationships321 and the benefits of greater 
father involvement. 322 The literature is inconsistent regarding the 
relationship between children's adjustment and frequency of contact 
with fathers (which is different from amount and type of contact). 323 
Better predictors of child outcomes are the amount of contact with 
the father, the father's responsiveness to the child's needs, and the 
319. These studies are reviewed in William V. Fabricius, Karina R. Sokol, Diaz & Sanford 
L. Braver, Parenting Time, Parent Conflict, Parent-Child Relationships, and 
Children's Physical Health, in PARENTING PLAN EVALUATIONS: ApPLIED RESEARCH 
FOR THE FAMILY COURT, (Kathryn Kuehnle & Leslie Drozd, eds. Forthcoming 2012) . 
320. See, e.g., Warshak et aI., supra note 76. The brief was endorsed and signed by 
twenty-eight social science experts. Id. See infra text accompanying note 348 for a 
consensus statement of eighteen experts. For more on the value of a child developing 
strong relationships with both parents, see Michael E. Lamb, Kathleen J. Sternberg, & 
Ross A. Thompson, The Effects of Divorce and Custody Arrangements on Children's 
Behavior, Development, and Adjustment, 35 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 393, 
393,400-01 (1997). 
321. BILLER, supra note 74, at 1-2; HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 66, at 118-20; 
Patrick Parkinson & Bruce Smyth, Research: Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction with 
Father-Child Contact Arrangements in Australia, 16 CHILD. & FAM. LAW Q. 289, 
289-304 (2004); Seth J. Schwartz & Gordon E. Finley, Mothering, Fathering, and 
Divorce: The Influence of Divorce on Reports of and Desires for Maternal and 
Paternal Involvement, 47 FAM. CT. REv. 506, 506-522 (2009); Zill et aI., supra note 
74, at 91,96,100. 
322. See, e.g., K. Alison Clarke-Stewart & Craig Hayward, Advantages of Father Custody 
and Contact for the Psychological Well-Being of School-Age Children, 17 J. APPLIED 
DEV. PSYCHOL. 239,260-63,265 (1996); Kelly, supra note 79, at 43-45; Kelly, supra 
note 287, at 969; Lamb et. ai, supra note 320, at 400-01; Richard A. Warshak, Social 
Science and Children's Best Interests in Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 
F AM. L.Q. 83, 90-94 (2000); Richard A. Warshak & John W. Santrock, The Impact of 
Divorce in Father-Custody and Mother-Custody Homes: The Child's Perspective, in 
CHILD. & DIVORCE 29, 38, 42-43 (Lawrence A. Kurdek ed. 1983); Warshak et aI., 
supra note 76. 
323. Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children's Well-Being: 
A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557,557-559 (1999); Kelly, supra note 79, 
at 44-45; Kelly, supra note 318, at 247. 
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emotional quality of the relationship. 324 The benefits of father 
involvement are most apparent when the mother values the father-
child relationship, the children witness little overt conflict between 
parents, and the father is reasonably well-adjusted, supportive, and 
authoritative.325 Other factors that mediate the impact of father-child 
contact are the length of the contacts, the types of activities that 
fathers share with their children, the extent to which transitions 
between homes avoid exposing children to inter-parental conflict 
(transfers can take place at a neutral location, such as a school, 
without parents being in close proximity to each other), and whether 
the contact disrupts the children's social lives and extracurricular 
activities (which is more likely to occur with relocation). 
Across studies, active involvement by competent divorced fathers 
is linked to more positive adjustment in children, but an influential 
1999 analysis of research revealed a relatively weak link between 
frequency of contact and child outcomes such as depression, 
aggression, and school performance. 326 This analysis led some 
researchers to doubt the value of increasing the amount of divorced 
fathers' parenting time.327 A closer look at the research shows 
inconsistent results due to umeliable measures that confuse frequency 
of contact with amount of parenting time.328 Additional support for 
giving greater weight to type of involvement than to frequency of 
contact comes from a Department of Education survey of nearly 
17,000 children.329 Reporting an association between fathers' greater 
participation in school activities and their children's better grades and 
behavior, the study concluded, "[I]t is not contact, per se, that is 
important, but rather other dimensions of involvement that go along 
with contact that are beneficial to children's lives. "(ndeed, contact 
324. BILLER, supra note 74, at Ill, 130, 190; Kelly, supra note 79, at 45. 
325. Paul R. Amato & Sandra J. Rezac, Contact with Residential Parents, Interparental 
Conflict, and Children's Behavior, 15 J. FAM. ISSUES 191, 192-93,205 (1994); Kelly, 
supra note 79, at 41,45. 
326. Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at 13; Daniel N. Hawkins, Paul R. Amato & Valerie 
King, Nonresident Father Involvement and Adolescent Well-Being: Father Effects or 
Child Effects?, 72 AM. Soc. REv. 990, 990--91 (2007). 
327. See, e.g., Hawkins, et aI., supra note 326, at 1003; Susan D. Stewart, Nonresident 
Parenting and Adolescent Adjustment: The Quality of Nonresident Father-Child 
Interaction, 24 1. FAM. ISSUES 217, 218 (2003). 
328. Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at 4-5. 
329. CHRISTINE WINQUIST NORD, DEEANN BRIMHALL & JERRY WEST, NAT'L CTR. FOR 
Enuc. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF Enuc., FATHERS' INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR 
CHILDREN'S SCHOOLS, at v, 75-76 & n.30 (1997), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/98091.pdf. 
148 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 41 
may be a mixed blessing if the contact is enough to tantalize children 
but not enough to satisfy.'>33O 
Recent studies find that college-aged children's relationships with 
their father improve the more post-divorce time they shared, a benefit 
seen up to and including the children having equal time with each of 
their parents.331 Not only does the long-term father-child relationship 
improve with more parenting time, but this benefit takes nothing 
away from the security of the mother-child relationship which 
remains constant as fathers' parenting increases up to and including 
equal time.332 
Because most custody arrangements are decided without a trial, 
the question remains about the extent to which existing research data 
serve as a useful guide in crafting a default rule for custody decisions 
made by the court.333 In particular, are the benefits to children of 
increased parenting time seen in families with high inter-parental 
conflict? Studies that measure frequency of contact rather than 
amount of contact report mixed results. 334 Some studies report that 
frequent father-child contact in high-conflict families is linked to 
poorer child outcomes.335 Some studies find no harmful effect of 
330. Id. at 75-78 (footnote omitted). 
331. A potential alternative explanation of the link between parenting time and emotional 
security is that the amount of parenting time reflects the pre-existing quality of the 
relationship. For instance, disinterested fathers might choose or be awarded little 
time; highly committed and capable fathers might end up with more time. For data 
that cast doubt on this alternative hypothesis, see Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at 
13 (explaining that the evidence to date is consistent with the hypothesis that "amount 
of parenting time exerts a causal effect on [father-child] relationship security."). 
Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 214, view with skepticism the self-selection 
explanation of the link between parenting time and subsequent emotional security. 
They point to evidence that most children and fathers want more time together but 
fathers are prohibited or dissuaded from obtaining additional time. Id. 
332. See generally Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 225-27. 
333. Id. at 210; Kelly, supra note 79, at 36, 40. 
334. Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 228-29. 
335. See, e.g., E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON, Should We Stay Together for the Sake of the 
Children?, in COPING WITH DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING, AND REMARRIAGE 93,99 (E. 
Mavis Hetherington, ed., 1999). The study most often cited in support of limiting the 
court's discretion to impose more equally balanced parent-contact schedules for high-
conflict couples (which advocates sometimes equate with any couple who take their 
custody dispute to trial) is Janet R. Johnston, Marsha Kline & Jeanne M. Tschann, 
Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and Frequent 
Access, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 576, 588 (1989). See, e.g., In re Marriage of 
Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862,865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Matter of Adoption ofFranciso 
A., 866 P.2d 1175, 1188 (N.M. 1993); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 
440 (Wis. 1995). Commentators often overlook the fact that, although Johnston et al. 
report a link between frequent contact and negative outcomes in high-conflict 
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frequent contact in high-conflict families. 336 One study finds negative 
effects of frequent father contact for boys but not girls.337 Another 
study finds negative effects for girls but not boys.338 Other studies 
report better child adjustment linked to more frequent father-child 
contacts in high-conflict families.339 
One explanation for the inconsistent results is that some measures 
of frequency of contact are proxies for frequency of child transfers 
between homes.34o Frequent transfers in the presence of two parents 
who manage their conflicts poorly expose children to more tension. 341 
Parenting time plans that more equally balance a child's time 
between homes can reduce the likelihood of such harmful exposure342 
by scheduling longer blocks of time with each parent, which reduces 
the number of transitions between homes,343 and by using locations 
families, this result was restricted to sole custody families. See Johnston, et aI., supra 
note 335, at 583-84. Children in high-conflict families who spent twelve to thirteen 
days a month with their fathers did not have worse adjustments than those in sole 
mother-custody homes. !d. 
336. See, e.g., CHRISTY M. BUCHANAN, ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & SANFORD M. DORNBUSCH, 
ADOLESCENTS AFTER DIVORCE 159-60 (1996); Margaret Crosbie-Burnett, impact of 
Joint Versus Sole Custody and Quality of the Coparental Relationship on Adjustment 
of Adolescents in Remarried Families, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 439,446 (1991). 
337. See Amato & Rezac, supra note 325, at 200. 
338. See Johnston et aI., supra note 335, at 585. 
339. See, e.g., William V. Fabricius & Linda 1. Luecken, Postdivorce Living 
Arrangements, Parent Conflict, and Long-Term Physical Health Correlates for 
Children of Divorce, 21 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 195, 202 (2007); J. M. Healy, Jr., 1. E. 
Malley & A. J. Stewart, Children and Their Fathers After Parental Separation, 60 
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 531, 541 (1990); Lawrence Kurdek, Custodial Mothers' 
Perceptions of Visitation and Payment of Child Support by Noncustodial Fathers in 
Families with Low and High Levels of Preseparation interparent Conflict, 7 J. 
APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 307, 320 (1986). 
340. See e.g., Johnston et aI., supra note 335, at 588. 
34l. See Kelly, supra note 79, at 44-45. 
342. See, e.g., id. at 45. 
343. Longer blocks of time allow children a sense of living with each parent rather than 
temporarily staying with them. But developmental psychologists caution that younger 
children need shorter periods of time away from each parent. See, e.g., Kelly, supra 
note 79, at 46 (citing Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development 
Research to Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions, 38 FAM. & 
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 297-311 (2000) ("To maintain and consolidate attachments 
formed with both parents prior to separation, it is important for infants and toddlers to 
have frequent contacts, including overnights, with their adequate nonresidential 
parents, without prolonged separations from either parent. ")). Marsha K. Pruett, 
Applications of Attachment Theory and Child Development Research to Young 
Children's Overnights in Separated and Divorced Families, in OVERNIGHTS AND 
YOUNG CHILDREN: ESSAYS FROM THE FAMILY COURT REVIEW 5-12 (2005); Marsha K. 
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and procedures for transfers that shield the child from tense exposure 
to bickering parents, such as one parent taking a child to school in the 
morning and the other parent retrieving the child in the afternoon. 344 
Adjusting the structure and location of transitions to reduce the 
child's exposure to conflict avoids the drawbacks of reducing 
parenting time from what might otherwise be optimal for the child. 
And reducing parenting time in response to conflict carries the 
drawback of giving the wrong message to parents that generating or 
sustaining conflict can be an effective strategy to override shared 
custody. Also, a uniform policy of discouraging shared parenting 
time when conflict is present overlooks the heterogeneity of the 
dynamics of inter-parental conflict. 345 In weighing the implications 
of conflict for custody dispositions, courts, operating under the best-
interest standard, can hear evidence that goes beyond identifying the 
presence of conflict and sheds light on the dynamics of the conflict 
and the contributions of each party to it. 346 
Pruett, Rachel Ebling, & Glendessa Insabella, Critical Aspects of Parenting Plans for 
Young Children, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 39-59 (2004); Richard A. Warshak, Blanket 
Restrictions: Overnight Contact Between Parents and Young Children, 40 FAM. CT. 
REv. 204-207 (2002). 
344. E.g., Kelly, supra note 79, at 47 ("[B]ecause children typically love both parents, 
reduced contact may not be the most beneficial solution. Instead, one searches for 
arrangements and interventions that will reduce the conflict and its impact on 
children. The presence of buffers that protect children from parental conflict should 
be assessed and encouraged, transitions arranged that occur in neutral sites such as 
school and day care, and mediation or parenting coordination interventions 
implemented."). 
345. See Braver et aI., supra note 34, at 212, 229, 232. 
346. Several authors call attention to a common phenomenon in custody disputes where 
one parent seeks to marginalize the other parent's relationship with the children, and 
conflict is generated merely because the other parent refuses to accept being removed 
from the children's lives. See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly, Parents with Enduring Child 
Disputes: Multiple Pathways to Enduring Disputes, 9 J. FAM. STUD. 37, 38 (2003) 
("[I]n as many as one third of entrenched parental disputes, several years after 
separation or divorce, one parent is clearly the high-conflict parent. In these cases, the 
other parent has emotionally disengaged and is being financially depleted and 
emotionally abused by the continuing legal and child-focused conflict. The high-
conflict parent continuously pulls the other into legal battles through unending 
petitions to the court, including repeated unfounded allegations, noncompliance with 
orders, and inappropriate behaviors such as spying and harassment that require 
remedy. The failure of professionals to differentiate these parents contributes not only 
to the disengaged parent's stress and great frustration, but also fails to lead to 
appropriate remedies."); Michael E. Friedman, The So-Called High-Conflict Couple: 
A Closer Look, 32 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 101, 114 (2004) ("[Regarding conflict driven 
by parents with borderline or narcissistic personality disorder, t]here seems to be 
general agreement that the ex-spouses of narcissistically disturbed individuals can do 
little to avoid a conflictual relationship short of acceding to their wishes. . .. [T]he 
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Studies that measure amount of parenting time (more relevant for 
evaluating proposals such as the approximation rule) as opposed to 
frequency of contacts report consistent evidence that more parenting 
time is not associated with poorer child outcomes in high-conflict 
families and in fact strengthens parent-child relationships and may 
protect children against some of the negative effects of exposure to 
inter-parental conflict. 347 
A 1997 review of research led to this consensus statement from 
eighteen expert researchers: 
To maintain high-quality relationships with their 
children, parents need to have sufficiently extensive and 
regular interaction with them.... Time distribution 
arrangements that ensure the involvement of both parents in 
important aspects of their children's everyday lives and 
routines-including bedtime and waking rituals, transitions 
to and from school, extracurricular and recreational 
activities-are likely to keep nonresidential parents playing 
psychologically important and central roles in the lives of 
their children.348 
narcissistically disturbed parent is capable of essentially unilaterally creating and 
maintaining post-divorce conflict."); id. at 116 ("When the concept of the high-
conflict couple is used to obscure what is really a conflict over custody/access and 
used to weight the outcome of that conflict in favor of the parent creating it in an 
attempt to exclude or marginalize the other parent, we have a serious miscarriage of 
justice. . .. We lose opportunities to make interventions that may deescalate the 
fight."). The court's reflexive assumption that all conflict is bilaterally instigated is 
reflected in the bromide, "Mother Teresa does not marry Saddam Hussein." For a 
critique of this assumption, see Richard A. Warshak, Stop Divorce Poison, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-
warshakistop-divorce-poison_b_778889.htmI. For evidence that the dynamics of 
conflict affects how the public would allocate parenting time, see Braver et aI., supra 
note 34, at 232-33, in which, when conflict and bad-mouthing is mutual, respondents 
favor awarding equal parenting time, but when one parent typically initiates conflict, 
respondents favor awarding a lot more time to the parent who refrains from fighting in 
front of the children and bad-mouthing the former spouse and is the target of the other 
parent's bad-mouthing. 
347. For a review and results of a new study, see Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at 24, 26, 
28 (concluding that more parenting time is associated with better father-child 
relationships for college students reporting frequent parent conflict and severe parent 
conflict; cautioning against applying these findings to families where there is violence 
or abuse). 
348. Lamb et aI., supra note 320, at 400. 
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Based on a more recent review, Kelly reinforces this expert 
consensus: "[I]t seems apparent that children's contacts with their 
adequate and interested fathers should occur during some part of each 
school week, as well as on alternate weekends, resulting in, more 
time with their children than has been possible with the alternating 
weekend schedule.,,349 
One problem with merely replicating the proportion of past 
parenting time is that a relatively smaller percent of time being cared 
for by a parent, when the parent and child live together full-time and 
the child is around the parent every day, may be sufficient to give the 
child an adequate sense of the parent's presence and involvement. 35o 
But when the parent's daily presence is gone, the child may need 
proportionally more time in order to sustain the sense of connection 
and a feeling of living with, rather than visiting, a parent. 351 Because 
of its exclusive emphasis on past caretaking, the application of the 
approximation rule can result in decisions far removed from optimal 
parenting time plans consistent with contemporary understanding of 
the needs of children whose parents live apart from each other. 352 
Studies of children living in joint-custody homes also support the 
importance of stability of relationships with both parents.353 
Professor Bauserman's meta-analysis of thirty-three studies, with a 
total sample of 1846 sole-custody and 814 joint-custody children, 
reported better adjustments for children in joint custody compared 
with those in sole custody, regardless of the level of parental strife. 354 
349. Kelly, supra note 318, at 247; see also Fabricius et at., supra note 34, at 231 ("In the 
typical family, more parenting time than the traditional alternating weekend visitation 
is required to achieve the well-recognized benefits of two involved parents, each with 
a close relationship to the child. An emerging consensus is that that a minimum of 
one-third time is necessary to achieve this criterion and that benefits continue to 
accrue as parenting time reaches equal (50-50) time."); Kelly, supra note 79, at 46; 
Warshak et at., supra note 76, at 16 ("[T]he highest quality relationships are 
maintained with access arrangements that promote a breadth of involvement between 
parent and child. Though this may not be tied in a perfect linear relationship to the 
frequency or amount of contact, the schedule of contacts does need to afford 
opportunities for each parent's involvement in the child's daily life and routines, 
including supervision of homework and chores, setting and enforcing limits, arranging 
and supervising interactions with peers, and dealing with conflicts."). 
350. See supra pp. 145-47. 
351. See Kelly, supra note 318, at 237-40. 
352. See supra pp. 142-5\. 
353. See Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-Custody Versus Sole-Custody 
Arrangements: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 99 (2002). 
354. Id. at 93 (noting that the category of joint custody included joint legal custody and 
joint physical custody, but both groups of children spent "a substantial proportion of 
time ... living with each parent."); see also Mo-Yee Lee, A Model of Children's 
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Advocates may wish to cite this research in support of replacing the 
best-interest standard with a default rule dividing the child's time 
between homes exactly equally, but most of the joint-custody studies 
involved families in which the division of time between homes was 
not necessarily equa1.355 
Public opinion polls and research show high levels of support for 
equal parenting after divorce.356 It is conceivable, though, that a 
Postdivorce Behavioral Adjustment in Maternal- and Dual-Residence Arrangements, 
23 J. FAM. ISSUES 672,691 (2002). 
355. The Bausennan analysis was published in a top-tier, anonymous, peer-review 
American Psychological Association journal, but it has been criticized. See, e.g., 
David A. Martindale, Diplomate in Forensic Psychology, Keynote Address at the New 
York State Interdisciplinary Forum on Mental Health and Family Law 2011 Annual 
Program: Imposed Joint Custody: Does it Work?, at 3-5 (May 14, 2011) (arguing that 
the adjustment of children whose parents chose joint custody is irrelevant to 
predicting adjustment when imposed by the court on one or both parents who sought 
sole custody). Martindale hypothesizes that couples who voluntarily choose joint 
custody have lower levels of pre-divorce conflict and that the lower conflict may be 
the source of their children's better adjustment rather than the custodial arrangement. 
ld. Beyond initial lower levels of conflict, it may be argued that the same factors that 
playa role in parents' agreeing to joint custody may also contribute to the positive 
outcomes in these families. ld. For convincing data that supports another view, see 
BRAVER & O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 194 (reporting that even when joint legal 
custody (which approximated de facto joint physical custody) was awarded over the 
mothers' objections, child support compliance was high); Fabricius et aI., supra note 
319 (drawing on data from the Stanford Child Custody Study (data set now available 
at http://www.socio.comlsrch/surnmary/afda/fam25-27.htm) and finding that in the 
majority (79.5%) of joint residential custody families, one or both parents did not 
initially want and agree to the arrangement); Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe & Sanford L. 
Braver, The Effects of Joint Legal Custody on Mothers, Fathers, and Children 
Controlling for Factors that Predispose a Sale Material Versus Joint Legal Award, 25 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 25 (2001); Eleanor E. Maccoby et aI., Postdivorce Roles of 
Mother and Fathers in the Lives of Their Children, 7 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 24, 34-35 
(1993) (explaining that children in joint residential arrangements compared with other 
children were most satisfied with the custody plan and showed the best long-tenn 
adjustments, even after controlling for factors that might predispose parents to select 
joint physical custody (such as education, income, and initial levels of parental 
hostility». 
356. See, e.g., William V. Fabricius & Jeff A. Hall, Young Adults' Perspectives on 
Divorce: Living Arrangements, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 446,454 (2000) 
(reporting that 70% to 80% of university students, regardless of whether they were 
male or female or from divorced or intact families, selected equal amounts of time 
with both parents as the best living arrangement for children after divorce). A 2009 
Nanos Research poll commissioned by a member of the Canadian Parliament found 
78% of those surveyed nationally (86% in Quebec) support legislation to create a 
presumption of equal parenting in child custody cases. Dads on the Air, Comment to 
DOTA: Shared Parenting Why it Works, F AM. L. WEB GUIDE (Jui. 06, 2009), 
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public opmIOn poll of other presumptions, including the 
approximation rule, would receive similar endorsement. A survey 
that allows participants to select which presumption they prefer 
among several options may yield more convincing data on public 
opinions regarding standards for adjudicating parenting time. In a 
study that comes close to this design, Arizona citizens were asked 
how they would allocate parenting time in response to hypothetical 
custody cases in which either the mother or father provided 75% of 
the childcare during the marriage.357 The most preferred postdivorce 
living arrangement selected by the participants was equal time with 
both parents.358 The next most preferred arrangement was to award 
more time to the parent who provided more predivorce childcare, but 
the division of time did not come close to the 75/25 allocation of time 
mandated by the approximation rule.359 Thus, more citizens favored 
awarding equal parenting time than awarding more time to the parent 
who provided 75% of pre divorce child-care; even those who favored 
an unequal distribution of parenting time did not favor replicating the 
predivorce division of caretaking time-they favored a more evenly 
balanced division of parenting time.360 
http://www.familylawwebguide.com.aulforumlpgltopicview/misc/41 71 lindex.php&ke 
ep_session=2049584127. In 2004, 85% of Massachusetts voters cast a "yes" ballot 
for the following nonbinding proposition: 
Presumption in child custody cases in favor of joint physical and 
legal custody, so that the court will order that the children have 
equal access to both parents as much as possible, except where 
there is clear and convincing evidence that one parent is unfit, or 
that joint custody is not possible due to the fault of one of the 
parents. 
Braver et aI., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, supra note 34, at 
217-18 (citing 2004 Massachusetts General Election Results, BOSTON.COM (2004), 
http://www.boston.comlnews/special/politics/2004_results/general_electionlquestions 
_alI_by_town.htm). The same proposition received 90% agreement when presented 
in a public opinion poll of a representative sample of Arizona adult citizens. Id. At 
218. Variables such as gender, age, income, political persuasion, marital status, or 
child support status (ever paid or received support) had no impact on the results. Id. 
357. Braver et aI., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, supra note 34, at 
222. 
358. Id. at 223-25. 
359. Id. 
360. Id. A second study with the same sample provides further evidence that the public 
prefers equal parenting time over the approximation rule. Id. at 230 (asking citizens 
to respond to a hypothetical custody case in which the division of predivorce child-
care was described as "about like average families in which both parents work full-
time (both M-F, 9-to-5)"). About 66% said that if they were the judge they would 
award equal amount of times to each parent. Id. at 231. Respondents who preferred 
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Naturally, prevailing public opinion is not an infallible guide to 
the best custody standards; but the stability and enforcement of 
family law and public policy reforms is related to cultural norms.361 
Also, recall that the Approximation Rule Survey shows that 
experienced attorneys and child custody evaluators have little 
confidence that the approximation rule would deliver the benefits 
anticipated by ALI; instead, they believe that presumptions of sixty-
four/thirty-six time allocation or of equal time are somewhat more 
likely to improve pre-trial settlement rates and reduce manipulative 
bargaining.362 
Public policies that encourage children's involvement with both 
parents after divorce are consistent with the scientific literature and 
with prevailing public sentiment. 363 Legislation can define the best 
interests of children to include parenting plans that maximize 
parenting time when feasible and when no circumstances exist that 
endanger the health, safety, or well-being of the children or a parent, 
such as violence, abuse, gross neglect, severely compromised 
parenting due to severe mental illness or severe substance abuse, or 
extremely poor and harmful behavior toward the children?64 Such 
policies clarify an aspect of children's best interests and establish an 
important context for custody negotiations.365 Evidence is 
accumulating that closer to equal distributions of time are linked to 
better outcomes for most children and parents.366 An exact equal-
time presumption, though, may bring similar liabilities as 
presumptions that elevate a single factor (e.g., gender, past 
caretaking, or children's preferences) above all others.367 For 
instance, if a parent uses additional time with the children to 
undermine their love and respect for the other parent, this behavior 
may offset the benefits of more time with the parent who manipulates 
the children in this manner. 368 But more time with the parent who is 
time distributions that memorialized the past would have endorsed the option of 
awarding more parenting time to the mother. ld. at 235. 
361. See Braver et aI., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, supra note 34, at 
215 (discussing three reasons why policy-makers pay attention to public values and 
opinions). 
362. Warshak, supra note 12. 
363. Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at 16. 
364. See id. at 27-28. 
365. Warshak, supra note 16, at 611-12. 
366. ld. 
367. ld. 
368. See Richard A. Warshak, Bringing Sense to Parental Alienation: A Look at the 
Disputes and the Evidence, 37 F AM. L.Q. 273,279 (2003). 
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the target of bad-mouthing may help children resist efforts to tum 
them against that parent. 369 
2. Quantity of Caretaking Time as an Index of Relative Strength 
and Quality of Parent-Child Relationships 
Notwithstanding the complications in measuring past caretaking 
time and the likelihood of the exceptions swallowing the rule, and 
even if the approximation rule could deliver on its promise to 
streamline family court cases, it is a mistake to assume that quantity 
of past caretaking is an objective index of the strength and quality of 
the parent-child relationship or of the relative ability of each parent 
to meet the child's needs after divorce.37o Some threshold of 
interaction is necessary to form and maintain a parent-child bond, but 
evidence from a variety of studies argues against equating the 
quantity of early caretaking with the quality of parent-child 
relationships.371 
Professor Lamb gives a scathing critique of the approximation 
rule, faulting it for 
institutionalizing a presumption that the relative 
psychological and formative importance of each parent's 
relationship with a child is directly proportional to the extent 
of the parent's involvement in prior care of the child. The 
available social science literature offers no empirical 
support for this presumption .... 
Other studies also show that, when questioned, 
children of divorce commonly complain that they had 
insufficient opportunities to interact with and be with their 
nonresident parents. Implementation of the approximation 
rule will not address the bases of this concern at all, because 
it focuses only on the amounts of time, not on children's 
psychological and emotional needs. 
369. See, e.g., id. at 294-97; Warshak., supra note 192, at 126-27; Braver et aI., Lay 
Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, supra note 34, at 232, (discussing a 
survey in which a representative sample of the Arizona public would award more 
parenting time to the parent who is the target of bad-mouthing). 
370. Warshak, supra note 16, at 604-09. 
371. See Michael E. Lamb,The Role of the Father: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE 
FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 4 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1976) (citing multiple 
studies to support the conclusion that, "[E]mpirical and theoretical considerations 
indicate that the amount of time spent together is a poor predictor of the quality of the 
infant's relationship with either mother or father"). 
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Research on topics as diverse as the effects of child 
care, the determinants and formative importance of parent-
child attachment, and the effects of postdivorce parenting 
arrangements on children's adjustment shows the dangers of 
confusing the quantity and quality of parenting or child care, 
yet ·the approximation rule places its emphasis exclusively 
and unashamedly on the quantity of time spent by parents 
with their children.372 
157 
Further evidence for the lack of relationship between caretaking 
quantity and quality comes from studies that show comparable 
adjustments of children in the custody of mothers and fathers who did 
not have the maj ority of custodial responsibility in the marriage. 373 
In addition, as recognized in several decisions, a child can spend 
more time with, and have a stronger tie to, the parent who is less 
equipped to meet his or her needs. 374 For instance, a boy may have a 
strong tie and close identification with a father who treats the mother 
violently. Children who are regularly and brutally beaten by their 
parents usually have very strong and tenacious attachments to these 
parents. 375 If offered a choice between a removal from their home or 
remaining in the abusive environment, many children will choose to 
remain with the abuser.376 The strength of a child's attachment to a 
372. Lamb, supra note 228, at 136. University of Cambridge Professor Lamb is generally 
regarded as one of the world's leading scholars on parent-child relations. See also 
NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, The Effects of Infant Child Care on 
Infant-Mother Attachment Security: Results of the NICHD Study of Early Child Care, 
68 CHILD. DEY. 860, 877 (\ 997) ("[C]hild care by itself constitutes neither a risk nor a 
benefit for the development of the infant-mother attachment relationship .... "); 
Nadya Pancsofar & Lynne Vernon-Feagans, Mother and Father Language Input to 
Young Children: Contributions to Later Language Development, 271. ApPLIED DEV. 
PSYCHOL. 571,582-83 (2006) (reporting that although mothers spoke more with their 
young children than did fathers, fathers had a greater impact than mothers on language 
development in two-year-olds). 
373. Warshak, Father-Custody and Child Development, supra note 30; Richard A. 
Warshak, How Children Fare in Father-Custody Homes, 15 FAM. ADvOC. 38 (1993). 
374. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bukacek, 907 P.2d 931, 936-37 (Mont. 1995); West v. 
West, No. 2059-93-4, 1994 WL 583195, at *1-2 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1994); 
Loveland v. Loveland, No. 92-3144, 1994 WL \78559, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. May 12, 
1994). 
375. See Douglas F. Goldsmith et aI., Separation and Reunification: Using Attachment 
Theory and Research to Inform Decisions Affecting the Placements of Children in 
Foster Care, 55 JUY. &FAM. CT. J. I, 1,6 (2004). 
376. Id. at 1 ("[C]hi1dren find themselves tom between forming an attachment to their 
foster parents while simultaneously longing to return to their parents. It may be 
surprising to some that this longing develops even when there has been a documented 
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parent, by itself, is a poor index of the quality of the relationships, the 
competence of that parent, or the ability of that parent to meet the 
child's current and future needs. 377 
Similarly, there is no evidence that parents who spend more time 
interacting with their children do so more competently.378 A so-
called "helicopter" parent's excessive involvement in caretaking, for 
example, can inhibit the child from developing an age-appropriate 
sense of autonomy,379 and parents can be highly effective issuing firm 
appropriate limits with minimal conversation, just as parents can be 
ineffective engaging in lengthy explanations.38o A parent who spends 
thirty minutes nagging, cajoling, threatening, and yelling to get a 
child to do his homework is not doing a better job than the parent 
who relies on the strength of her authority and a five-second reminder 
to secure the child's compliance. 
Contrary to the quantitative standard of the approximation rule, 
developmental psychologists strongly agree that the impact of the 
parent-child relationship is better predicted by models that include 
factors in addition to the amount of parent-child interaction, such as 
the parent's sensitivity and responsiveness to the child's needs and 
the emotional quality of the relationship.38I When adolescents 
history of maltreatment."); see also Stephanie D. Block et ai., Abused and Neglected 
Children in Court: Knowledge and Attitudes, 34 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 659, 659 
(2010) ("[M]ost children wanted to return home."). 
377. See Goldsmith et ai., supra note 375, at 1,4,6. 
378. See PETER N. STEARNS, ANXIOUS PARENTS: A HISTORY OF MODERN CHILDREARING IN 
AMERICA 99-103, 212-13 (2003). 
379. Id. at4~7. 
380. See, e.g., E. Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox, & Roger Cox, Family Interactions and 
the Social, Emotional, and Cognitive Development o/Children FollOWing Divorce, in 
THE FAMILY: SETTING PRIORITIES 71, 72 01. c. Vaughan & T. Berry Brazleton eds., 
1979); KYLE PRUETT, FATHERNEED: WHY FATHER CARE Is AS ESSENTIAL AS MOTHER 
CARE FOR YOUR CHILD 33-34 (2000) ("Over and over again in the science of father 
care, researchers point out that it is the quality of interaction between father and 
child-that is, whether the father is sensitive to the child's needs and reactions-that 
determines the overall value of his involvement in his child's life, not the quantity. 
Counting the minutes that child and father are in each other's company tells us very 
little about the ultimate influence of the father on the development of his child. What 
fathers do with their children, how they do it, and, probably most important, how they 
are with their kids matter more than how often or long they do it."); Richard A. 
Warshak & John W. Santrock, Children of Divorce: Impact of Custody Disposition on 
Social Development, in LIFESPAN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: NON-NORMATIVE 
LIFE EVENTS 241, 255 (Edward J. Callahan & Kathleen A. McCluskey eds., 1983). 
381. Empirical support for this model is reported in Fabricius et ai., supra note 34, at 224. 
In this model, parenting time exerts a causal relationship on child outcomes by setting 
a ceiling on the potential amount of parent-child interaction. Amount of time spent 
doing things together, in addition to the parent's responsiveness and low exposure to 
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describe the essence of their relationships with their parents, they 
focus on the same factors: the amount of time spent doing things 
together, the ability to rely on the parent to meet the child's needs 
(e.g., "She's always there for me."), and the emotional valence of the 
relationship.382 
Kelly faults the approximation rule for failing to "consider the 
quality and meaning of children's relationship [sic] with each parent, 
the age and developmental needs of children, or the substantial 
changes in parental role and function necessarily precipitated by the 
separation of the parents.,,383 In her appraisal of the primary caretaker 
presumption Kelly describes concerns that are equally applicable to 
the approximation rule: 
[I]t ignores the quality of the relationship between the child 
and the primary caretaker in favor of counting hours and 
rewarding many repetitive, concrete behaviors. Indeed, the 
most important emotional and interactive behaviors 
promoting children's development and psychological, 
social, and academic adjustment, such as love, acceptance, 
respect; encouragement of autonomy, learning, and self-
esteem, [and] moral guidance ... are not considered.384 
The Principles anticipates arguments about the importance of 
quality over quantity and offers the defense that it is better to rely on 
quantitative measurements because these are easier to make and thus 
avoid qualitative disputes.385 Legal reforms do involve trade-offs 
between multi-factored, nuanced, and individualized decision making 
versus ease of administration. 386 But as the earlier analysis showed, it 
is not clear that the approximation rule would be easier to administer 
than the best-interest standard.387 Even if it is easier, defending a 
measure merely because it is convenient brings to mind the story of 
inter-parental conflict, contributes to the emotional security of the relationship. See 
Kelly & Emery, supra note 70, at 356; Michael E. Lamb, Placing Children's interests 
First: Developmentally Appropriate Parenting Plans, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 98, 
106-07 (2002). 
382. Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 223. 
383. Kelly, supra note 318, at 241. 
384. Kelly, supra note 46, at 130. 
385. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08, cmt. c ("Any different measure, even if it is 
otherwise reasonable, would only reintroduce the kinds of qualitative disputes that the 
caretaking-functions factor is intended to reduce.") (emphasis added). 
386. Warshak, supra note 16, at 609. 
387. See supra Part IX.B.1. 
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the man searching for his lost keys in the wrong place because the 
light is better. The man will not find his keys and courts will not 
define children's best interests by relying on what is easier to 
measure merely because it is easier to measure. When legislators 
weigh the potential of the approximation rule to streamline family 
court cases, they should not assume that time invested in past 
caretaking is an objective index of the strength of a child's 
attachment to a parent, the quality of the relationship, the competence 
of the parent, the ability of the parent to meet the child's needs, or the 
motivation of the parent to do SO.388 
X. REVISITING THE BEST-INTEREST STANDARD 
We began with the question of whether the benefits of broad 
discretion in contemporary custody adjudication outweigh the 
drawbacks, and whether a more determinate rule can adequately 
address legitimate concerns about the best-interest standard while 
avoiding hazards such as an unacceptable degree of harm to 
children's welfare.389 This question has no simple answer. Professor 
Schneider is probably correct that, with respect to custody disputes, 
"[ A] motley mix of discretion, guidelines, and rules may be the best 
we can do ... , [B]oth a purely discretionary and a purely rule-based 
system would have intolerable drawbacks.,,390 Such a mix of 
discretion and parameters for its exercise is precisely what has 
evolved in contemporary applications of the best-interest standard.391 
Statutory and case law guidelines include elucidation of criteria to 
be considered in defining best interests,392 which helps provide a 
uniform framework for the court's application of the standard 
through a nuanced investigation of a wide range of factors relevant to 
children's welfare. 393 Other parameters include public policy 
statements promoting frequent and continuing access to both 
parents,394 specific parenting plans,395 mandates for mediation in cases 
with no domestic violence, and specification of factors, such as 
388. Warshak, supra note 16, at 608. 
389. See supra Part V. 
390. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2219. 
391. See, e.g., John 1. Sampson, Bringing the Courts to Heel: Substituting Legislative 
Policy for Judicial Discretion, 33 FAM. L.Q. 565 (1999) (discussing Texas legislative 
restrictions on judicial discretion in custody trials). 
392. Kelly & Emery, supra note 70, at 356. 
393. Warshak, supra note 16, at 612. 
394. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b) (Deering 2010); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
153.001(a)(1) (West 2010). 
395. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.311-17 (West 2011). 
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family violence and children's exposure to parental conflict, that limit 
the range of permissible outcomes.396 
In addition to statutory and case law parameters, the best-interest 
standard operates in a contemporary context of programs and 
supports that provide attractive alternatives to litigation. 397 This 
context includes a menu of model parenting time plans that educate 
parents about the range of options and the benefits and drawbacks of 
each;398 parent education programs about the impact of divorce on 
children;399 encouragement of non-adversarial dispute resolution, 
such as therapeutic mediation400 and collaborative law approaches;401 
involvement of mental health professionals as consultants, evaluators, 
and counselors; and post-mediation settlement conferences.402 It is 
reasonable to speculate that the contemporary context of the 
application of the best-interest standard contributes to the very low 
rate of custody trials. Support for this speculation is found in studies 
that demonstrate significantly lower trial rates as a result of 
mediation.403 
396. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (West 2011). 
397. Warshak, supra note 16, at 603. 
398. See, e.g., PLANNING FOR PARENTING TIME: ARIZONA'S GUIDE FOR PARENTS LIVING 
APART, ARIZ. SUPREME COURT (2001), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us 
Idr/pd£'parenttime/parenttimela.pdf; OR. JUDICIAL DEP'T, BASIC PARENTING PLAN 
GUIDE FOR PARENTS (2008), available at http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/docs/OSCA 
Icpsd/courtimprovementlfarnilylaw/CO VER. Ver08FINAL2008. pdf. 
399. Jill R. Bowers et aI., A Review o/Online Divorce Education Programs, 49 FAM. CT. 
REv. 776 (2011); Tamara A. Fackrell et aI., How Effective Are Court-Affiliated 
Divorcing Parents Education Programs? A Meta-analytic Study, 49 F AM. CT. REv. 
107 (2011); Amanda Sigal et aI., Do Parent Education Programs Promote Healthy 
Postdivorce Parenting? Critical Distinctions and a Review o/the Evidence, 49 FAM. 
CT. REv. 120 (2011). 
400. See, e.g., Marsha K. Pruett & Janet R. Johnston, Therapeutic Mediation with High-
Conflict Parents: Effective Models and Strategies, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY 
MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND ApPLICATIONS 92, 95 (J. Folberg, A. Milne & 
P. Salem, eds. 2005). 
401. TESLER, supra note 275, at 86. 
402. Reforms aimed at helping couples avoid litigation are endorsed by the PRINCIPLES. 
See, O'Connell, supra note 45, at 129 (clarifying that most of these programs would 
be unaffected by adoption of the approximation rule, which is intended to operate 
solely as a default provision for parents who are unable to reach an agreed-upon 
division of parenting time). 
403. Robert E. Emery, Lisa Laumann-Billings, Mary C. Waldron, David A. Sbarra & Peter 
Dillon, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Custody, Contact, and Coparenting 
12 Years After Initial Dispute Resolution, 69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
323,323 (2001). 
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The parameters and programs that set the contemporary context 
for the application of the best-interest standard, while bending to the 
current of political pressures from advocacy groups, also reflect the 
immense progress that social scientists have made in understanding 
children's adjustment after divorce.404 As psychologists Robert 
Emery and Joan Kelly summarize, "A continuing stream of 
sophisticated social science and developmental research has 
contributed a more complex understanding of factors associated with 
children's positive outcomes and psychological problems in the 
context of both marriage and divorce.,,405 
The contemporary mix of judicial discretion, parameters, and 
programs to assist parents in reaching informed and mutually 
agreeable custody decisions should renew confidence in the viability 
of a standard that carries the moral superiority of treating each child 
as an individual. 
XI. CONCLUSIONS 
The approximation rule represents a return to a 19th-century 
mechanistic view of the universe. It assumes that a complex 
system-a family-can be understood by breaking it down into 
discrete measurable units without regard for the transactions and 
balance among the units. 406 It reduces the intricate rhythms of a 
family's life together to only those interactions that can be measured 
with a stopwatch. In so doing, it no more captures the essence of the 
family than the number of words and lines convey the meamng, 
value, and essence of a poem. 
Proponents of the approximation rule believe it is more 
straightforward than the best-interest standard and is a reasonable 
proxy for children's best interests.407 I have shown that the rule is 
more difficult to implement than its supporters acknowledge and fails 
to provide an acceptable short-cut to determining best interests.408 
We have no data to suggest that a past caregiving presumption will 
reduce the likelihood of litigation or of children's harmful exposure 
to parental conflict. But we do have data that tie other variables to 
child well-being. Why should we require judges to ignore variables 
that are supported in the scientific literature in favor of one variable 
404. Warshak, supra note 16, at 611-12. 
405. Kelly & Emery, supra note 70, at 352. 
406. Warshak, supra note 16, at 613. 
407. Richard A. Warshak, Best Interests and the Fulfillment of Noble Aspirations: A Call 
for Humbition, 1 CHILD. DEV. PERSP. 137, 139 (2007). 
408. Id. 
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that has no support?409 In the few cases that go to trial, courts can 
better discern children's needs if the court's vision extends beyond 
the narrow confines of judging the merits of parents' competing 
claims about their parenting histories.410 
The best-interest test is not easy or efficient. Facing such a 
complex task, we naturally welcome anything that can make the job 
easier.411 But a default rule that is difficult to implement and is out of 
touch with current knowledge of child development is no 
improvement. The approximation rule strives to relieve courts of a 
comprehensive and individualized inquiry into children's best 
interests.412 Instead of elevating anyone factor above all others and 
treating children as a homogenous group, a contemporary application 
of the best-interest standard allows a multi-factored inquiry into 
individual children's needs that can be regularly updated as new 
knowledge emerges.413 By reducing the decision to a single factor, 
the approximation rule cannot capture the depth and richness of each 
parent's role in a child's life.414 
Rather than abandon a comprehensive inquiry to shape a parenting 
plan, public policy should continue to encourage private, amicable, 
settlements while giving those few custody cases that reach the 
courtroom all the attention that children deserve. 
409. Lyn R. Greenberg, Diana J. Gould-Saltman & Robert Schnider, The Problem With 
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